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CRIMINAL LAW IN A STATE OF FLUX
BY WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH & JENNIFER A. DEMARRAIS
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
Legal Times
July 26, 1993
"Taking into account the majority's additional
criterion for overruling [its precedents] - that a case
either was decided or reaffirmed by a 5-4 margin
over a spirited dissent' - the continued vitality of
literally scores of decisions must be understood to
depend on nothing more than the proclivities of the
individuals who now comprise a majority of this
Court."
Then Justice Thurgood Marshall, so writing two
years ago in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991), thus prophesied the inevitable overruling of
"endangered precedents." Indeed, an example he
cited, Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), has
now been overruled. That case had protected
defendants against prosecution for offenses based on
conduct for which they had already been prosecuted.
Under United States v. Dixon, 61 U.S.L. W. 4835
(1993), prosecutors can now bring criminal charges
against defendants who have already been held in
contempt of court for the same underlying conduct.
Groups working with battered women may hail this
decision, since it allows women to bring other
charges against attackers who have been imprisoned
for violating restraining orders, but it is troubling. It
demonstrates the Supreme Court's willingness to
ignore its precedent and increases the risk for other
cases that Marshall listed as endangered. It is also
another example of the disturbing trend in the Court's
decisions in recent years of narrowing the rights of
those accused of crimes and restricting the scope of
federal habeas relief for state prisoners.
Actual Innocence
The Court handled 35 criminal cases this term,
three of which were dismissed (two for an
improvidently granted writ, and one for mootness).
One of the most widely noted was Herrera v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). Although the Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment forbids the execution of an innocent man,
in the end it refused to review Leonel Herrera's claim
of innocence on technical grounds. In a 5-1-3
opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
the Court held that because federal habeas courts do
not sit to correct errors of fact, claims of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence do not
state a ground for relief absent an independent
constitutional violation.
Herrera was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death in January 1982. In July 1982, he
pleaded guilty to a second murder. He
unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on the first
murder on direct appeal and in collateral proceedings
in Texas, and in a federal habeas petition. Ten years
after his conviction, he commenced a second federal
habeas proceeding, claiming that newly discovered
evidence proved that he was "actually innocent" of
both murders and that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited his execution. He supported his claim
with affidavits stating that his brother, now deceased,
had committed the murders.
Because Herrera was not challenging a procedural
error, the Court held that his claim of actual
innocence was not cognizable. Federal habeas courts
sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in
violation of the Constitution, not as forums in which
to relitigate state trials. Although the Court
"assumed, for the sake of argument," that a "truly
persuasive demonstration" of actual innocence would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional
and warrant federal habeas relief, the Court set the
threshold showing "extraordinarily high" and found
that Herrera fell short.
Rehnquist noted that Texas law requires a
defendant to file a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence within 30 days after
imposition or suspension of his sentence. Because
state legislative judgments regarding criminal
procedure are entitled to substantial deference, the
Court held that Texas' refusal to consider Herrera's
new evidence eight years after his conviction did not
transgress any principles of fundamental fairness or
violate the due-process clause of the 14th
Amendment. Herrera was not left without a forum
in which to raise his innocence claim, however. He
could have filed a request for executive clemency, the
traditional fail-safe remedy for such claims.
The Court's decision leaves open the possibility
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that an extremely persuasive showing of actual
innocence would indeed render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas
relief. However, the threshold has been set so high
that relief may be impossible to obtain. The District
Court in Herrera ordered a hearing into the
credibility of Herrera's claim, but the Supreme Court
determined on its own that he did not make the
showing of innocence necessary to trigger relief.
Although the Court acknowledged that his affidavits
had "probative value." Herrera was executed on May
12, 1993.
Miranda Benefits
Two other habeas cases decided by an equally
divisive Court received much less media attention
than Herrera, but may prove to be more important.
Decided the same day, Withrow v. Williams, 113 S.
Ct. 1745 (1993), affirmed federal habeas jurisdiction
over claims based on violations of Miranda v.
Arizona, 284 U.S. 436 (1966), but Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), changed the
standard of review.
In Withrow, the Court was asked to extend the
restrictions on the exercise of federal habeas
jurisdiction set forth in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976), to bar review of a state prisoner's claim
that his conviction rested on statements obtained in
violation of Miranda, when be has been given a full
and fair opportunity to litigate hat claim in state
court. Justice David Souter, writing for the majority,
declined.
Robert Williams made inculpatory statements
during a station-house interrogation about a double
murder, after a police sergeant threatened to "lock
[him] up." He had not been advised of his Miranda
rights. The state trial court declined to suppress
these statements, and Williams was convicted of
first-degree murder. The District Court granted his
habeas petition for relief, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Souter stated that the limitation on federal habeas
relief set forth in Stone, a Fourth Amendment case,
rests on prudential concerns. And unlike the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, which is not a
personal constitutional right and does not seek to
redress the victim's injury, Miranda safeguards a
fundamental trial right by protecting a defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
In addition, whereas the exclusionary rule excludes
reliable evidence and merely serves to deter future
violations, Miranda facilitates the accurate
determination of guilt by guarding against the use of
unreliable statements at trial.
Although Justice Sandra Day O'Connor pointed out
in her dissent that many Miranda claims involve
technical errors and not coercion, the Court reasoned
that practical considerations warrant permitting
habeas review of Miranda claims. Eliminating
habeas review of Miranda issues would not prevent
a state prisoner from converting his claim into a
due-process claim that his conviction rested on an
involuntary confession. Therefore, extending Stone
would not lessen the workload of the federal courts.
Withrow may indicate a step back from the Court's
inclination to restrict federal habeas review, but in
light of Brecht, it is more likely that practical
concerns explain the Court's refusal to extend Stone.
Prior to 1966, the Court heard several involuntariness
claims a year. Miranda has had the effect of cutting
down substantially on the number of those cases that
the Supreme Court hears, by allowing lower federal
courts to grant relief. Closing the door to habeas
claims based on Miranda violations would not close
the door to Miranda, and it could potentially increase
the Court's workload by increasing the number of
direct appeals. Although the conservative majority of
the Court may with to turn back the clock on criminal
defendants' rights to 1966, it is not willing to open
the floodgates of litigation.
Meanwhile in Brecht, the Court adopted a new
harmless-error standard for collateral review of
constitutional trial error that will make it harder for
petitioners to get relief in federal habeas courts.
Relief must be granted only where the error "had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict."
At his trial for first-degree murder. Todd Brecht
admitted to shooting the victim, but claimed it was an
accident. To impeach his testimony, the prosecution
made several references to the fact that, before he
was given his Miranda warnings, Brecht failed to tell
anyone that the shooting was.accidental. The state
also made several references to Brecht's
post-Miranda silence, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether, in considering Doyle violations in federal
habeas corpus proceedings, it is consistent with due
process and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury to abandon the "harmless beyond a reasonable
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doubt" standard of review in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967), in favor of the standard set forth
in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946),
that the error "had substantial and injurious effect."
In its decision, however, the Court appears to have
gone further and determined that the Kotteakos
standard applies in determining whether habeas relief
must be granted because of any constitutional trial
error. Although the parties conceded that the state's
references to Brecht's post-Miranda silence were
constitutional "trial error" in violation of Doyle, the
Court held that the error did not "substantially
influence" the jury's verdict. The justices concluded
that Brecht was not entitled to habeas relief.
Doyle error is trial error that occurs during the
presentation of the case to the jury, and as such, is
amenable to harmless-error analysis. Although the
Court has applied the Chapman standard on direct
review and in several federal habeas cases, Chief
Justice Rehnquist said that stare decisis did not apply
because the Court had never squarely addressed the
issue of the applicable standard on collateral review.
Rehnquist balanced the costs and benefits of
applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas
review, and concluded that the Kotteakos standard is
better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral
review. The Chapman standard undermines the
state's interest in finality and infringes on its
sovereignty in criminal matters. It also frustrates
society's interest in the prompt administration of
justice. State courts are fully qualified to identify and
evaluate constitutional error and its prejudicial effect.
In addition, the writ of habeas corpus is an
extraordinary remedy; "an error that may justify
reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support
a collateral attack on final judgment." The Court
concluded that it is illogical to require federal habeas
courts to use the same approach to harmless-error
review that state courts use on direct review.
By introducing an entirely new standard of review
for federal habeas cases, Brecht opens the door to
constitutional mischief. Lowering the standard is
undoubtedly going to entice every prosecutor in the
country to attempt to implement the new
harmless-error standard on direct appeal. Even a
moderately talented prosecutor can try to persuade the
trial court to accept questionable evidence and then
argue for the Kotteakos standard on appeal.
Terry Stop
Despite the Court's division in Herrera, Withrow,
and Brecht, it showed solidarity elsewhere, with
many unanimous or nearly unanimous rulings. One
example is Minnesota v. Dickerson, 61 U.S.L.W.
4544 (1993), where all nine justices agreed that the
police may seize non-threatening contraband
discovered through the sense of touch during a
protective patdown, so long at the search stays within
the bounds of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Although five of the justices felt that the officer
exceeded Terry by manipulating the object be felt in
Timothy Dickerson's pocket, the boundaries of this
"plain feel" exception to the warrant clause have not
been well defined, so its future impact is uncertain.
It a case that was decided by a 5-4 margin over
spirited dissent is vulnerable to be overruled, then
Herrera, Brecht, and Withrow could be placed on the
endangered list. It will be interesting to see what
effect the imminent change in the makeup of the
Court will have in this area, especially since the
nominee has had little judicial experience in federal
habeas law.
William W. Greenhalgh is a professor of criminal
justice and director of the Criminal Justice Clinic and
the E. Barrett Prettyman/Stiller Fellowship Program
at Georgetown University Law Center. Jennifer A.
DeMarrais, Greenhalgh's research assistant, recently
completed her first year at Georgetown Law.
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IS INNOCENCE SUFFICIENT?
AN ESSAY ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S CONTINUING
PROBLEMS WITH FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
By Joseph L. Hoffmann *
Copyright (c) 1993 Trustees of Indiana University.
Indiana Law Journal
Summer, 1993
68 Ind. L.J. 817
In October, 1992, during the first session of the
U.S. Supreme Court's new Term,' the Court heard
oral arguments in Herrera v. Collins,2 a major
death-penalty case. In Herrera, the Court was asked
to decide, for the first time, whether a death-row
inmate's claim of actual innocence, not linked to any
particular procedural errors that might have occurred
during the inmate's state trial or appellate litigation,
may serve as the basis for a grant of federal habeas
corpus relief.
Later in the Term, the Court will hear oral
arguments in Withrow v. Williams,' a major habeas
corpus case. Williams represents the Court's second
attempt in less than a year to redefine the standard of
review to be used by a federal habeas court in
reexamining a so-called 'mixed" (fact-and-law)
constitutional issue that was previously decided by a
state court.' On June 19, 1992, the Court announced
its judgment in Wright v. West,' another habeas case
posing the same standard-of-review question.
Although all nine Justices agreed in West that the
lower court's grant of habeas relief should be
overturned, and that the petitioner's state conviction
should be upheld, no opinion was joined by more
than three of the Justices. In all, the Justices wrote
five separate opinions in West,6 mostly for the
purpose of discussing the appropriate standard of
review.
Although it may not appear so at first glance,
Herrera and Williams are in fact closely related. The
two cases both spring from the same historical source
- the Supreme Court's adoption, in the late 1970s, of
an essentially process-oriented approach to
interpreting the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause." Ever since the Court
made the fundamental (and, I believe, misguided)
jurisprudential choice to treat the Eighth Amendment
as a "super due process clause, "' rather than as an
invitation for the federal courts to review the merits
of individual state-imposed death sentences, the Court
has struggled to resolve the tension between a narrow
focus on death-penalty procedures and the
(substantive) view that federal judges have a
responsibility to prevent state-imposed death
sentences from being carried out when such sentences
are undeserved.
This struggle has taken place in two separate
arenas - the law of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment and the law of federal habeas
corpus. In the Eighth Amendment arena, the Court's
process orientation has triggered a doctrinal
explosion, as the Court searches for perfect
death-penalty procedures that can guarantee a perfect
result.' In the habeas arena, the Court, motivated in
large part by the growth of Eighth Amendment law,
has restricted the availability of habeas relief in all.
cases, whether capital or noncapital, on a variety of
procedural grounds."o These procedural habeas
restrictions, however, often can be avoided (and
habeas relief obtained) if a petitioner can present a
colorable claim of actual innocence."
Thus, by a bizarre and convoluted path, the Court
has reached the conclusion that the substantive merits
of a death-row inmate's case are relevant to the
disposition of his habeas petition. But the relevance
is indirect and limited - actual innocence is
sometimes a necessary, but (at least presently) never
a sufficient, condition for a grant of habeas relief.
Seen against this jurisprudential background,
Herrera and Williams are flip sides of the same coin.
On the one hand, Herrera tests the bounds of the
Court's determination to stick with a process-oriented
approach to the Eighth Amendment. In the special
realm of death-penalty law, a claim of actual
innocence surely gives rise to the most compelling of
all possible arguments that the Eighth Amendment
has case-specific substantive significance. Williams,
on the other hand, provides the Court with an
opportunity to continue the gradual transformation of
federal habeas corpus from a remedy for all
constitutional errors into a vehicle for evaluating the
substantive merits of a state prisoner's case -
whether those merits are measured in terms of actual
innocence (in the typical, noncapital criminal case,
such as West and Williams) or the moral
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deservedness of a prisoner's death sentence. As I
will explain below, this transformation of habeas,
which was advocated decades ago by Judge
Friendly," is a predictable, and perhaps inevitable,
by-product of the Court's refusal to read the Eighth
Amendment as authorizing federal courts to review
the merits of individual death sentences.
Indeed, although both West and Williams are
noncapital cases, perhaps the best explanation for the
Court's surprising failure in West to coalesce behind
a heightened habeas standard of review for "mixed"
constitutional issues is the recognition, by at least
some Justices,"' that the procedural orientation of
modern Eighth Amendment law already severely
limits the ability of habeas courts in capital cases to
"do the right thing." These Justices may have
realized that if the Court in West eviscerated another
major category of habeas claims by ordering habeas
courts to defer substantially to previous state-court
resolutions of "mixed" issues," then the habeas
courts might be rendered impotent in the face of even
a clearly incorrect use of the death penalty, because
those courts might be unable to find a constitutional
error on which to set aside the death sentence. In
short, these Justices may have preserved de novo
habeas review of "mixed" issues in part because such
review allows habeas courts to reach, in individual
capital cases, a sometimes highly desirable
substantive goal - the setting aside of undeserved
death sentences.
As long as the Court's Eighth Amendment
emphasis remains primarily procedural, further
evolution of habeas law in the direction of making
habeas relief increasingly contingent on the merits of
a state prisoner's case is likely. By forcing habeas
courts to consider the merits of each criminal case
(including the moral deservedness of each use of
capital punishment) as a prerequisite to awarding
habeas relief, the Court may be able to accomplish
through the reform of habeas law at least part of what
it has failed to achieve via the Eighth Amendment --
namely, to empower the federal courts to perform (at
least in a limited fashion) the important substantive
function of separating those state death-row inmates
who truly deserve the death penalty, and hence ought
not to obtain habeas relief, from those who do not.
Twenty years after the Court's landmark decision
in Furman v. Georgia,'" which kicked off the
modern era of death-penalty law, the Court is not
much closer than it ever was to resolving the tension
between procedure and substance in its death penalty
jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment. Nor is
it clear that the Court will ever succeed in its quest
for a satisfactory approach to the federal review of
state death-penalty cases. The root of the problem
lies in the simple fact that the Justices are both
lawyers and human beings.
Why does the allegedly conservative,
pro-federalism, and anti-criminal-defendant Court
continue frequently to grant review in, and often to
reverse, state death-penalty cases? 7 Why does
Eighth Amendment law continue to grow more and
more complicated, despite the impassioned pleas from
Justice Scalia to simplify and reduce these federal
procedural restrictions on the states?'
The answer, of course, is that the Justices are only
human. This is important for two reasons. First, as
human beings, the Justices know that they and their
fellow human beings are imperfect - human decision
makers will inevitably make mistakes. Second, as
human beings, the Justices (or at least most of them)
care more about reaching the right result in a
death-penalty case than they do in almost any other
kind of case that comes before them. Perhaps the
most important task any judge can ever perform is to
ensure that the government not kill a person unless
that person truly deserves to die (which means, under
our current laws, that the person is both guilty of a
capital crime and among the most death-deserving of
those persons who are guilty of such crimes). Since
the Court is effectively the last decision maker in
most capital cases," and since the Court's decision
to allow an execution to proceed is irrevocable, the
Justices (or at least most of them) feel a special
responsibility for the outcome. In the words of
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Woodson v.
North Carolina, death is "different"" - if for no
other reason than precisely because most members of
the Court, and most of the rest of us as well, believe
it is so.
Because they are only human, the Justices (or at
least most of them), along with most of the judges in
the lower federal courts, pay much closer attention to
the outcomes in capital cases than they do in other
criminal cases. The experience of twenty years since
Furman suggests that, like moths to a flame, federal
judges cannot avoid getting involved in state capital
cases - these cases consistently receive far closer
federal scrutiny than noncapital criminal cases, even
in a relatively conservative era and almost regardless
of the particular federal judge's ideological or
jurisprudential views.' And whenever a judge finds
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a capital case in which he or she believes an injustice
is about to be done, the judge is naturally inclined to
do whatever is in his or her judicial power (and
maybe even a few things that arguably are not)' to
rectify the perceived injustice.
The simplest and most direct way for a federal
judge to reverse the outcome of a state capital case
with which the judge disagrees would be to rule that
the death penalty is unconstitutional (in Eighth
Amendment terminology, that it constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment") as applied to the individual
death-row inmate. But the Court, in a series of
death-penalty cases dating back to 1976, has declined
to lead the lower federal courts down the path of
case-by-case substantive review of state capital cases
under the Eighth Amendment?
Rather, the Court has done what most lawyers tend
to do - it has tried to find procedural solutions for a
substantive problem. One of the basic traits of most
lawyers is an extremely strong belief in the value of
procedures. Lawyers and judges tend to believe (or
at least tend to pretend to believe) that, at least in
theory, if a procedure can be improved enough, then
the results produced by that procedure will
necessarily be right.
The course of modern Eighth Amendment
death-penalty law reflects this lawyerly
overconfidence in the value of procedures. In 1972,
in Furman v. Georgia,' the Court struck down all
existing state death-penalty statutes because it was
profoundly disturbed by the results they produced.
The Justices found the death penalty, as administered
by the states, to be arbitrary, discriminatory,
"freakish[ ]," or a combination of the above.' Four
years later, in Gregg v. Georgia' and its companion
cases," the Court allowed the states to try again
under new death-penalty statutes. The primary
difference between the pre-Furman and post-Furman
statutes was the adoption of a "guided discretion" 28
approach to capital sentencing, in which the states
created new procedures and instructions designed to
help the sentencer (whether judge or jury) make a
better choice between life and death for a particular
defendant. The Gregg Court apparently felt that the
Furman problem of morally inappropriate death
sentences in the states could be solved simply by
improving the procedures of capital sentencing.
In several post-Gregg cases, the Court has
confronted the claim that, despite these improved
procedures, the death penalty was nevertheless
imposed against a person who did not deserve it. For
example, in Lockett v. Ohio," the Court reviewed
the case of Sandra Lockett, who (based on the
evidence introduced at her trial) did nothing more
than agree to drive the getaway car for three men
who intended to rob a pawnshop." In the course of
the robbery, one of the men shot and killed the
pawnbroker, but Lockett never realized that such a
killing might occur, and was not physically present in
the pawnshop when it happened." For various
reasons, none of the men received a death sentence,
but Lockett did.32
The Court could have decided that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the Eighth Amendment
barred the imposition of a death sentence against
Sandra Lockett. This substantive position was in fact
advocated by Lockett's attorneys (who included
Anthony Amsterdam) in both the petition for
certiorari and the brief on the merits.33 Instead,
however, the Court chose to reverse Sandra Lockett's
death sentence on a procedural ground, apparently
concluding that the sentencing judge would have
reached the right result if only the Ohio statute had
not prevented him from considering Lockett's minor
role in the crime as a "mitigating circumstance[ ]."'
Similarly, in Godfrey v. Georgia,3 5 where the
defendant instantly killed his wife and his
mother-in-law with a shotgun during a domestic
dispute, and then calmly turned himself in to the
police, the Court could have declared that such a case
simply was not a proper one for the imposition of a
death sentence. Rather, the Court chose to reverse
Godfrey's death sentence on another procedural
ground, apparently concluding that the jury would
have reached the right sentencing result if only it had
received a proper instruction about the statute's
"aggravating circumstance" provision that the crime
be "wanton, vile, or heinous." 3
In these and other post-Gregg decisions, the Court
has struggled mightily to find procedural solutions to
what appear to have been, at bottom, substantive
disagreements with the outcomes of the particular
cases. The Court has occasionally, to be sure,
focused its attention in a death-penalty case on
substance rather than procedures. But the Court has
done so only when it could identify an entire class of
defendants, subject to easy legal definition, that it
believed should be categorically ineligible for the
death penalty. Thus, in Coker v. Georgia," the
Court excluded from death-eligibility the class of
rapists who do not kill. Likewise, in Tison v.
Arizona," the Court excluded certain
felony-murderers who do not themselves kill,
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defining the class of death-ineligible persons in
standard legal terms based on the presence or absence
of "indifference to the value of human life."" And
in Thompson v. Oklahoma' and Stanford v.
Kentucky,4 ' the Court established that juveniles
under age sixteen at the time they commit the crime
cannot be given the death penalty, but those sixteen
or above can.
By contrast, in Penry v. Lynaugh,' a majority of
the Court declined to exclude mentally retarded
defendants as a class from death eligibility because
Justice O'Connor, who provided the crucial fifth vote
rejecting the substantive argument, could not find an
easy legal definition for the kind of mental retardation
that necessarily renders an individual defendant
undeserving of the death penalty.' Instead, a
different majority of the Court reversed the death
sentence on yet another procedural ground - that the
Texas statute prevented the sentencing jury from
giving full consideration to the defendant's mental
retardation as a "mitigating circumstance. "4
There are two major difficulties with an essentially
process-oriented solution to a substantive problem,
such as the problem of bad outcomes in death-penalty
cases. First, and most obviously (despite the
traditional lawyer's view), even perfect procedures
cannot guarantee perfect results - which means that
procedural law may wind up being pushed beyond its
proper limits. If a federal judge, for instance, is
disturbed by what he or she perceives to be the
wrong result in a capital case, and if the only way to
reverse the decision is to find a federal procedural
error, then the judge will be under severe, maybe
insurmountable, pressure to find (or perhaps
manufacture?) such an error - even if, in the
abstract, the procedures used in the state courts were
well within the range of reasonable fairness. In other
words, a process-oriented solution for a substantive
problem can, if the matter is important enough to
compel judicial action, provoke an otherwise
unwarranted expansion of procedural law.
Second, given the first difficulty, the procedural
law is likely eventually to expand to the point where
it substantially over-regulates. The primary problem
is that, every time a federal court announces a new
procedural rule for the purpose of overturning a state
death sentence with which the judge does not agree,
the rule does not disappear after the particular case is
over - rather, it becomes federal law that must be
applied by other courts to other cases. As the federal
law becomes increasingly more complex, procedural
errors may be found in many cases even though all
courts would agree that the results of those cases
were correct. In the death-penalty context, habeas
courts often deal with cases in which the federal
procedural rules were violated, but in which the
result of the proceeding was nevertheless correct, and
in which reversal would thus impinge on the values
of federalism and comity without producing a
corresponding improvement in the basic justice of the
outcome. In such cases, habeas courts face severe
pressure to devise and apply curative methods (such
as "harmless error" doctrines) to preserve the correct
result even in the face of a recognized violation of
federal procedural law.
Aware of the adverse impact that its Eighth
Amendment procedural doctrines have had on the
administration of state death-penalty systems, but
unwilling to dismantle completely the doctrines
themselves (because of stare decisis and the
usefulness of the doctrines in setting aside undeserved
death sentences), the Supreme Court has, predictably,
looked for ways to minimize the practical effect of
these procedural doctrines.
One such strategy was to create, within the context
of Eighth Amendment law itself, a "harmless error"
doctrine designed to preserve some morally deserved
death sentences despite clear violations of Eighth
Amendment procedural law. The two prime
examples of this approach are Zant v. Stephens'
and Barclay v. Florida,' which at one time were
derided as having effectively "deregulated" the use of
the death penalty."
But time has demonstrated that most state
death-penalty cases do not fit within the
Stephens/Barclay "harmless error" doctrine, the
applicability of which depends entirely on certain
peculiarities of a particular state's death-penalty
statute and/or case law.' So the Court has turned,
instead, to making changes in federal habeas law as
the primary method for limiting the practical effect
on the states of the Court's ever-growing body of
procedural Eighth Amendment law.
Thus, in a line of cases starting with Wainwright
v. Sykes," the Court has held that the federal
claims of death-row inmates (and other habeas
petitioners as well) are subject to valid state
procedural bars arising from the strategic decisions or
oversights of defense lawyers in failing to present
claims for resolution by the state courts (unless the
oversight rises to the level of constitutional
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ineffectiveness of counsel). Through expansive
interpretations of the exhaustion,o
successive-petition, 5' and abuse-of-the-writS2
doctrines, the Court has also made it difficult for
habeas petitioners to litigate federal claims that have
not yet been presented to the state courts, that have
previously been rejected by a habeas court, or that
could have been but were not raised in a prior habeas
petition. And, in Teague v. Lane?,a the Court also
barred most habeas petitioners from relying on
violations of new federal rules that were established
or substantially clarified after the state courts had
already completed their review of the petitioner's
case. 54
These changes have limited the general availability
of federal habeas relief for state prisoners. But, in
developing these limits on habeas, the Court has been
sensitive to the need for an exception that permits
case-by-case federal review of the merits of an
individual petitioner's conviction or sentence. For
example, in connection with the procedural default,
successive-petition, and abuse-of-the-writ doctrines,
the Court has recognized an exception for particular
cases in which a grant of habeas relief is required to
prevent a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."s
And Teague contains exceptions for cases involving
(1) new rules restricting the substantive ability of the
states to punish certain kinds of conduct, or to punish
certain categories of defendants, and (2) new rules
that are required to ensure "fundamental fairness,"
and without which confidence in the reliability of the
outcome of the relevant proceeding would be greatly
diminished.'4
Of course, these exceptions apply only when a
habeas petitioner can also point to a particular federal
procedural error in his case, and do not constitute
independent grounds for habeas relief. Each of the
exceptions can nevertheless be characterized as
focusing the habeas courts indirectly on the
substantive merits of a petitioner's case. As such,
the exceptions have moved habeas law towards a
more substantive, "actual innocence"-based approach.
In capital cases, although the Court has recently
defined the aforementioned exception to the
successive-petition doctrine quite narrowly," the
Court's substantive approach to habeas law offers a
valuable, albeit limited, antidote to the
process-oriented view of the Eighth Amendment.
Where will habeas law go from here? What can
we expect out of the Supreme Court in the next Term
or two?
The recent changes in habeas law have done much
to ameliorate the potential impact of the Court's
Eighth Amendment law on the administration of the
death penalty by the states. Yet there remain two
large categories of habeas claims that are not
generally precluded by the above doctrines, and that
still pose a major practical problem for the states: (1)
errors in the application of existing federal procedural
law (largely involving "mixed" questions of fact and
law) that were raised by the defense lawyer in the
state courts but were there ignored or otherwise left
unremedied; and (2) violations of existing federal law
that were not raised in the state courts due to alleged
constitutional ineffectiveness of defense counsel
(currently defined in terms of "performance" and
"prejudice," two "mixed" fact-and-law issues).'
These two categories of habeas claims remain broadly
available to death-row inmates, at least in first federal
habeas petitions, and can prolong significantly the
course of post-conviction litigation or lead to reversal
of a death sentence.
If the Court is ever going to satisfy the vocal
critics of active federal-court intervention in state
capital cases, including some of its own members,5 9
it will have to find a way to limit these two
categories of habeas claims. This is where the future
action is most likely to occur.
As previously explained, the Court's failure in
Wright v. West' to adopt a deferential standard of
review for "mixed" issues may reflect the
unwillingness of most of the Justices to alter habeas
law to the point of "deregulating" state death-penalty
cases altogether. The Court, as a whole, does not
appear ready to leave the death-penalty issue
exclusively to the states, despite the fact that a few
Justices might like to see that happen." Thus,
although the standard of review for "mixed" issues
was not resolved in West and could come up again as
early as the current Term,' it seems unlikely that
Justice Thomas will soon find a majority to support
his belief in across-the-board deference by federal
habeas courts to prior state-court adjudications of
federal issues.
The Court currently has before it two cases,
however, that might provide vehicles for significant
habeas reform. One of these cases, the
aforementioned Withrow v. Williams,' involves a
habeas court's disagreement with a state court over a
particular application of the rule in Miranda v.
Arizona," a rule the Court has recently described,
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at least at the margins, as prophylactic.' In
Williams, assuming that Justice Thomas does not
obtain a majority for his proposed "deferential"
habeas standard of review, the Court could choose to
[*829] restrict habeas relief on the alternative
ground that Miranda violations, like the Fourth
Amendment violations in Stone v. Powell,'
generally do not raise doubt about the actual guilt of
the petitioner. Thus, as the Court did with the
Fourth Amendment claims in Stone, it could hold in
Williams that prophylactic, purely Miranda-based
Fifth Amendment claims generally are not cognizable
in federal habeas.' This position was set forth in
1989 in a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justice Scalia, in Duckworth v. Eagan.6
The only problem with this approach to deciding
Withrow v. Williams is that the lower federal courts
not only found a Miranda violation in Williams, they
also found the petitioner's relevant statement to be
involuntary.' The case thus involves a core, rather
than a mere technical, Fifth Amendment violation,
and Williams therefore may not be a good vehicle for
addressing the issue raised by Justice O'Connor in
Duckworth v. Eagan.' At the very least, the Court
will be required to do some fancy footwork to reach
the Stone v. Powell issue in Williams.
The other potentially significant habeas case
currently pending before the Court is Lockhart v.
Fretwell," a capital case in which the habeas
petitioner claims that his defense lawyer failed to
raise in state court a federal issue that would have
been a winner at the time under the then-existing
federal-circuit precedent (that is, the claim would
have required the federal circuit court to reverse the
petitioner's death sentence), but that is no longer a
winner because of a subsequent pro-state change in
the circuit's interpretation of the governing federal
law. The federal court of appeals granted petitioner's
request for habeas relief, and ordered the entry of a
judgment favorable to him (imposing a life
sentence).'
Fretwell is an interesting case because it involves
the issue that Justice Powell wrote about in a
concurring opinion in Kimmelman v. Morrison. 3
There, a habeas petitioner argued that he should
obtain habeas relief because his defense lawyer failed
to raise in state court a Fourth Amendment objection
to the admission of a crucial piece of incriminating
physical evidence. The Court found the petitioner's
claim cognizable in habeas, despite Stone v. Powell,
because it was based on constitutional ineffectiveness
of defense counsel rather than on the Fourth
Amendment directly.' Justice Powell, writing
separately, noted that the case might be outside the
proper scope of "prejudice" for Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance purposes, because a victory by
the petitioner in state court would not have been
based on actual innocence, but instead would have
been an undeserved windfall." Because this issue
was not raised by the parties in Kimmelman, it was
not squarely addressed by the Court majority.76
Fretwell is, if anything, a much stronger case for
the application of Justice Powell's approach to
defining Sixth Amendment "prejudice" than was
Kimmelman v. Morrison. In Fretwell, a victory by
the petitioner would have been worse than a mere
windfall; it would have been an out-and-out mistake
under .the governing federal law as currently
construed by the federal courts. Another way to look
at the Fretwell case is as follows: Even if the
petitioner in Fretwell were entitled to habeas relief,
what would happen if the state were to convene a
resentencing hearing? The hearing would be
conducted according to current federal law, meaning
that the same federal procedural "error" that led to
reversal of the petitioner's original death sentence
could occur lawfully at the resentencing hearing.
Of course, this is precisely why the lower federal
court chose the unusual remedy of ordering entry of
judgment in favor of the petitioner, instead of letting
the state try to resentence him to death.
Unfortunately, it is also precisely why Fretwell is a
poor vehicle for considering the views articulated
[*831] in Justice Powell's Kimmelman v. Morrison
concurrence. The decision below in Fretwell is so
flawed that the Court can reverse it for any one of
three reasons: (1) it can adopt Justice Powell's views
about ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) it can hold
that a pro-state change in the interpretation of federal
law occurring after a petitioner's trial or sentencing
hearing always applies retroactively to the petitioner's
habeas case, thus precluding habeas relief;n and/or
(3) it can reject the lower court's unusual remedy,
and find the case to be an example of per se
"harmless error." Because the Court has three ways
to reverse in Fretwell, the case may wind up being
decided on an alternative ground without addressing
the Kimmelman issue.
Even if neither Withrow v. Williams nor Lockhart
v. Fretwell turns out to be an important habeas case,
however, the issues lurking therein are important and
very likely to arise again in the immediate future.
The extension of Stone v. Powell to prophylactic
Fifth Amendment claims (and others similarly
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unrelated to actual guilt), and the adoption of Justice
Powell's Kimmelman v. Morrison views about the
Sixth Amendment's effective assistance of counsel
guarantee, would dramatically reduce the practical
effect on the administration of the death penalty of
the two remaining major categories of federal habeas
claims. More importantly, these changes would
render habeas relief more heavily dependent upon the
substantive merits of individual cases - both of these
changes stem from the basic idea that, in general,
certain claims do not justify habeas relief because the
alleged violations tend to be irrelevant to actual guilt.
In the end, the Supreme Court may be fighting a
losing battle. The changes in habeas law that have
already occurred, or that might occur in Williams,
Fretwell, and/or similar cases, are second-best
measures designed to introduce the merits of state
capital cases into federal habeas courts through the
back door - they do not represent the needed frontal
assault on the process orientation of modem Eighth
Amendment law. As such, these habeas cases do not
hold out much promise of solving, once and for all,
the problems created by the Court's misguided use of
a procedural solution for a substantive problem.
Perhaps Herrera v. Collinse will force the Court
to rethink the grave implications of its procedural
Eighth Amendment approach. If the Court holds in
Herrera that "actual innocence" in a death-penalty
case is sufficient to justify habeas relief, then it is
only a short step further for the Court to say that
"moral undeservedness" of a death sentence is
similarly sufficient.' And if the Court is willing to
entertain that possibility, then the federal courts may
someday be able to spend their time dealing directly
with the question of whether particular state-imposed
death sentences are morally deserved. If not, then
the Court, and the lower federal courts as well, may
be consigned to the murky depths of habeas law for
the foreseeable future.
AUTHOR'S EPILOGUE
On January 25, 1993, while this Essay was going
to press, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Herrera v. Collins.' The decision strongly
suggests that the Court is not yet prepared to hop off
the endless merry-go-round that it boarded when it
first chose to interpret the Eighth Amendment in
death-penalty cases primarily in procedural, rather
than substantive, terms.
Unfortunately (for both the defendant and, in my
view, the jurisprudence of the Eighth Amendment),
the Court in Herrera never reached the question
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of a defendant who makes an adequate
showing, based on newly discovered evidence, of
"actual innocence." The Court did not reach this
question because six of the Justices concluded that,
no matter what standard might be used to define such
an "adequate showing," the defendant in Herrera
could not possibly meet the standard." Thus Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for five of the six Justices,
identified some of the practical and legal/doctrinal
problems that would follow the adoption of an "actual
innocence" Eighth Amendment rule. Nevertheless,
he proceeded to dispose of the case based on the
"assum[ption], for the sake of argument," that "a
truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'
made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to
process such a claim." I Justice White, concurring
in the judgment, made the same assumption.n
If the Court had reached the constitutional issue in
Herrera, it might have used the case to begin the
process of "substantifying" its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Indeed, a reading of the "tea leaves"
in Herrera suggests that, if the issue were properly
raised, a majority of the Court would interpret the
Constitution to require at least a limited federal
(substantive) review of a defendant's claim of
innocence. The three dissenters would require such
a review whenever a defendant could show that he is
"probably actually innocent."" And Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote in
concurrence: "I cannot disagree with the fundamental
legal principle that executing the innocent is
inconsistent with the Constitution. Regardless of the
verbal formula employed . . . the execution of a
legally and factually innocent person would be a
constitutionally intolerable event.""
The problem is that, given the disposition of
Herrera, the Court is highly unlikely to reach the
Eighth Amendment issue anytime soon. Justice
O'Connor, in particular, frankly admitted her
Pollyannaish hope that the Court might be able
forever to duck the question:
Resolving the issue is neither necessary nor
advisable in this case. The question is a sensitive
and, to say the least, troubling one. . . .
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. . . mhe Court has no reason to pass on, and
appropriately reserves, the question whether federal
courts may entertain convincing claims of actual
innocence. That difficult question remains open. If
the Constitution's guarantees of fair procedure and
the safeguards of clemency and pardon fulfill their
historical mission, it may never require resolution at
all."
Unfortunately, it should be obvious to anyone
(except maybe Justice O'Connor) that, no matter how
good the applicable procedures, any system that relies
on human beings to make decisions will eventually
make a mistake. This being so, the only remaining
argument against recognizing a (limited) [*8341
right to federal substantive review seems to be the
Herrera majority's claim that, "Few rulings would be
more disruptive of our federal system than to provide
for federal habeas review of free-standing claims of
actual innocence."' The Court's federalism
concerns are valid, but its conclusion could not be
more wrong. In truth, nothing could be more
disruptive of our federal system than the present
world .of federal habeas litigation in capital cases - a
bizarre world in which state-court judgments are
stayed for years, even decades, while defendants
argue procedural Eighth Amendment issues unrelated
to the factual correctness of their convictions and
sentences, and states' attorneys respond by raising
technical habeas defenses similarly unrelated to the
merits of the case.
This bizarre world of federal habeas litigation is
the natural by-product of the Court's procedural
Eighth Amendment orientation. It is time for the
Court to recognize the fundamental interdependence
of death-penalty and habeas law, and bring an end to
the ascending spiral of technicality and complexity
that currently characterizes both bodies of law. It is
time for the Court to put some "substance" back into
the Eighth Amendment.
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performance renders the result of the trial unreliable
or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. . . .
1.
Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the
ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the
defendant of any substantive or procedural right to
which the law entitles him." Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at
844. Fretwell thus narrows somewhat the scope of
the Sixth Amendment's
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, and thereby
further limits the availability of habeas relief in one
of the two remaining large categories of habeas
claims.
81. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
82. Id. at 869.
83. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
84. Id. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined in
part by Stevens and Souter, JJ.).
85. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
86. Id. at 871, 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 861.
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Putting Military Justice On Trial;
Spate of Cases Challenges Fairness of System
That Requires Prosecutors to Judge the Judges
BY JOHN MURAWSKI
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
Legal Times
May 10, 1993
Imagine a court system where the judge owes his
job - and his next assignment - to the office
prosecuting the case.
Defense lawyers in the military-justice system face
that scenario every day, and they've been arguing for
years that it's unfair to defendants. But their
challenge to the way military judges are appointed
and assigned got nowhere - until now.
Bolstered by a recent split decision from the Court
of Military Appeals, defense lawyers have their best
chance ever of getting the Supreme Court to hear a
head-on challenge to the basic structure of the
military-justice system.
They contend that military judges, because they
serve in the military chain of command, lack the
judicial independence that any fair justice system
requires.
"We feel the system is set up in such a way that
[the military judge] certainly appears to side with the
government," says Navy Cmdr. Timothy Young, who
heads the appellate defense team for the Navy and
Marine Corps. "We're arguing that the appearance
of evil is as great as the evil itself."
The Supreme Court could vote at its May 14
conference on whether to hear two companion cases,
Graf v. United States and Weiss v. United States.
But even if the justices deny certiorari, other
challenges are now in the pipeline, brought through
the efforts of defense lawyers, like Young, in the
Navy-Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast
Guard, who are working together as never before.
Joining in their effort are civilian experts Eugene
Fidell of D.C.'s Feldesman, Tucker, Leifer, Fidell &
Bank, and Alan Morrison of Public Citizen Litigation
Group.
These critics are finally getting audiences in the top
military appellate court, which picks and chooses its
cases - and for so long simply chose to ignore these
sweeping challenges.
The judges may be motivated in part by sympathy.
Many on the military bench have themselves begun to
question the system.
"I think the military-justice system is
extraordinarily flawed," says retired Marine Lt. Col.
Jonathan Rubens, a former judge on the Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Military Review from 1987 to 1990
who now practices in the District. "I am almost
ashamed to have been a part of it for almost 17
years. I wouldn't want my children tried under it."
For many other judges, though, the criticisms are
off base. Having to answer to a military authority,
they maintain, doesn't compromise their
jurisprudence.
"When I was an appellate judge, never once did I
stop to consider what impact my decisions would
have on my career," says Ron Garvin, who sat on the
Navy-Marine review court from 1982 to 1984 and is
now the clerk at the D.C. Circuit.
Retired Navy Capt. Owen Cedarburg, a former
chief judge on the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Military Review, agrees. "I think it's a red herring,
quite frankly," he says. "Somebody's looking for a
novel approach, maybe interested in making some
law, and they throw it out to see who's going to buy
it."
Whatever their personal view, many judges - and
perhaps the Supreme Court - believe that the
challenges should be heard, if only to reaffirm the
validity of the current system. If left unanswered,
the well-crafted constitutional questions about due
process and the appointments clause could slowly
erode the legitimacy of military justice, which
extends to some 1.5 million active service members
worldwide.
And it covers them wherever they are and
whatever they are doing, as the Supreme Court made
clear in Solorio v. United States (1987).
Solorio held that even a crime with no "service
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connection" - committed by military personnel, but
not directly related to active duty - could be tried in
the military courts, thus reversing the Court's own
1969 finding, O'Callahan v. Parker, that confined
military justice to the military enclave.
Solorio is the only case from the military-justice
system the Court has heard since the justices were
given review authority over it in 1984.
With such a broad reach, backed up by harsh
punishment, including the death penalty, the
military-justice system looms large in the lives of
those serving in the armed forces. They deserve
independent judges, critics argue, who are not
beholden to the military command, which, through
each service's judge advocate general (JAG), is
carrying out the prosecution and overseeing the
judges' performance.
"The problem is judicial independence," says
Public Citizen's Alan Morrison, who had his first
brush with military justice more than 30 years ago as
a Navy prosecutor. "Are these people looking over
their shoulders every time they make a decision
against their boss - who is the JAG - and worried
about being transferred?"
The solutions Morrison and others propose are
fixed terms for the judges, who now serve at the will
of the military commander; appointments made in
compliance with the Constitution's appointments
clause, including confirmation by the Senate; and an
evaluation process that does not rely on the JAG.
"The most likely way the system would be
reformed would be something like having judges
appointed to a five-year term, during which they
would receive no fitness reports," explains Dwight
Sullivan, a captain in the U.S. Marine Corps who is
the armed services' lead defense counsel on the Graf
and Weiss cases, among others.
The Canada Model
Sullivan and his allies realize they face a daunting
task in trying to force wholesale change in their
system of justice. Still, they can take heart from the
fact that Canada's highest court did just that last year.
In February 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada
held unconstitutional a standard military
court-martial, Genereux v. Her Majesty the Queen.
The court's finding: that the tribunal hearing the case
appeared to lack security of tenure, financial security,
and institutional independence. The result has been
a rethinking of the Canadian military's approach to
justice.
So far, though, the U.S. challengers have fallen
short of such a dramatic result. Their best showing
was a split last December on the Court of Military
Appeals in Weiss, one of the cases seeking cert.
(The court, the highest in the military-justice system,
is made up of five civilians who serve 15-year
terms.)
One dissenter, Judge Robert Wiss, urged the court
to resolve the issues, which focus on the
appointments clause.
"Not since Solorio v. U.S. has an appeal presented
questions of such fundamental importance to the
institutional integrity and viability of the military
justice system as does this one," wrote Wiss, a
Chicago lawyer and former member of the Navy JAG
Corps who joined the court in January 1992.
Also dissenting, and writing separately, was Chief
Judge Eugene Sullivan. Only two judges, H. F.
Gierke and Walter Cox III, signed the majority
opinion; Judge Susan Crawford also voted with the
majority, but did not agree with their legal reasoning
and wrote separately. This messy lineup makes it
more likely the Supreme Court will hear the case.
But on the other lead case, Graf, the Court of
Military Appeals voted 5-0 against the defendants.
"In reality," wrote Chief Judge Eugene Sullivan,
"the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides
substantial independence and protection for military
judges, both trial and appellate, despite their
subordinate position in the military hierarchy."
The Long March
The military-justice system has certainly evolved
from the days when officers handled all
courts-martial, and lawyers and judges were nowhere
to be found.
Not until 1950, when Congress imposed the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, did military rules
recognize that officers organized for a court-martial
might not fairly treat a defendant brought before
them. To remedy that, the code called for a "law
officer" to preside over the traditional court-martial.
In more serious cases, a lawyer was required to
prosecute and defend.
357
And the code created a check on the military: the
civilian Court of Military Appeals.
Then, in 1968, the Military Justice Act went
further, requiring for the first time that lawyers
handle prosecutions and defenses in all courts-martial.
The act also created military judges, who unlike the
less powerful "law officers" could not be overruled
by juries.
The 1968 act also set up the Courts of Military
Review in each branch - intermediate appellate
courts that can handle far more cases than the Court
of Military Appeals, which takes only 8 percent of
petitions for review. The result: A defendant finally
had a real chance of having his court-martial
reviewed.
Congress added still another layer of review in
1984, when it made decisions of the Court of
Military Appeals reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The most recent change came in 1991, when the
Court of Military Appeals was expanded from three
to five judges.
Still, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs
continues, even within the Court of Military Appeals.
Chief Judge Sullivan is trying to persuade Congress
to upgrade the court's status from an Article I to an
Article III court, with life tenure for judges. One of
his arguments: that judges may be improperly
influenced, particularly late in their 15-year term, by
the fact that they must ask the Department of Defense
for reappointment.
But the focus of concern about improper influence
in the military-justice system is its core component,
the JAG. The Army, the Navy-Marine Corps, and
the Air Force each has a JAG who overseas both the
prosecutors and the defense lawyers appointed to
represented defendants. The JAGs are also
responsible for overseeing the 95 trial judges who
handle general courts-martial, as well as the 35
appellate judges on the four intermediate courts of
military review. The JAGs even perform some
limited judicial review of minor violations.
"The JAG plays a variety of different roles. He
can play a supervisory role, a prosecutorial role, and
a quasi-judicial role," says Marine Col. Theodore
Hess, director of the 15-lawyer Government
Appellate Division, which represents the JAG in
court. "A problem arises only if he mixes up his
roles at the same time."
Why are all these duties handled by one office?
The approach is designed to preserve the military
command structure. Should military commanders
decide it is necessary, because of war or other
"military exigencies," they can, through the JAG,
quickly shift judges or reschedule trials. In addition,
the military-justice system has a responsibility not
shared by civilian justice: ensuring that subordinates
obey the orders of their superiors. That argues for a
hierarchy headed by a JAG, say supporters.
But the JAG does not operate without restriction.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice expressly
forbids the JAG to influence the way judges make
decisions. The Court of Military Appeals, in its Graf
decision, noted its willingness to consider complaints
about violations of that rule.
Finding a violation, though, is not usually a
straightforward exercise, as two often-cited cases
illustrate.
The Court of Military Appeals found improper
command influence in September 1991, when they
ruled on an appeal brought by Navy Machinist's Mate
James Mabe. The improper influence was a
memorandum from the chief trial judge - Navy Capt.
Ron Garvin, now the D.C. Circuit clerk - who
pointed out that judges in that circuit sentenced more
leniently than did other judges. Still, the court let
stand Mabe's sentence, in part because the Navy JAG
had instructed the trial judge to ignore Garvin's
memo.
Perhaps the best-known claim of improper
influence came in Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Military Review v. Carlucci, which was successfully
brought by the appellate judges themselves. In 1988,
they sued the secretary of defense after the
department's inspector general began an investigation
of all the court's judges, following their controversial
reversal of Navy heart surgeon Donal Billig's
conviction for manslaughter.
The judges argued that they could not remain
independent if they feared they would be investigated
for making controversial decisions. The Court of
Military Appeals agreed and granted a protective
order to the judges against the Pentagon. The court
also appointed a special master, who found no
probable cause for the Pentagon to go forward with
the investigation.
One of the judges who joined the Billig suit was
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Rubens, now of counsel to D.C.'s Bond, Conte &
Norman. Rubens believes he was the subject of
retaliation for having participated in the judges' revolt
against the Pentagon. In his fitness reports, Rubens
recalls, he was "damned with faint praise" by
seemingly well-meaning comments such as "eager to
improve" - remarks that would presumably apply to
any judge.
Then, "right after the Billig case," and only two
years into his tour of duty, Rubens says he was told
he would be transferred to California. Although he
managed to stay the early transfer, Rubens says he
was later "banished to Panama" and given duties he
considered a downgrade from being a judge.
According to Rubens, that impression - real or
imagined - has convinced him that judges have
trouble remaining impartial when they are concerned
about possible punitive action for their decisions on
the bench.
Notes Young, the head of the Navy-Marine Corps
Appellate Defense Division: "What we have here is
a direct analogy of the attorney general writing
performance evaluations of U.S. Court of Appeals
judges."
Young and others seeking more independence for
military judges have focused on fixed terms, with a
different evaluation process, and on the appointments
clause.
"In the military justice system, transfer from
judicial duties is the functional equivalent of
removal," writes Eugene Fidell in his certiorari
petition for Graf. "The removal power renders the
removable official subservient to the holder of the
power. "
In Weiss, the defense lawyers argue that the
appointment of military judges by the JAG is a
violation of the Constitution's appointments clause,
which requires that federal judges be appointed by the
president, a cabinet secretary, or a court of law.
Because the JAG is none of the above, his
appointments are invalid, argue the defense lawyers,
who want the judges appointed by a politically
accountable individual.
They are relying in part on a recent Supreme Court
decision, Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, (1991) which affirmed that reading of the
appointments clause. The case came to the attention
of the military defense lawyers in part because
Sullivan and a Coast Guard colleague, Lt. Cmdr. G
Arthur Robbins, happened to be at the court, seeking
admission to the high court's bar, on the day Freytag
was argued.
"It's wonderful how the law grows," notes Fidell.
"Here is a case that comes out of the U.S. Tax
Court, and its potential relevance to the
military-justice system wasn't on anybody's mind at
first."
But Hess, the JAG's appellate lawyer, and others
reject the appointments-clause argument, pointing out
that military judges, as military officers, are already
nominated by the president and confirmed by the
Senate each time they are promoted to a higher
grade.
"I've been confirmed six times," says Hess.
Ironically, the defense lawyers who are fighting to
make military judges more independent are
themselves working for the judge advocate general.
But their own independence, they say, is not an issue
- or a concern.
Sullivan, in fact, is on his way to Charlottesville,
Va., where the military will foot the bill for this
master of law degree from the University of Virginia.
His criticism of the military-justice system has
apparently not harmed his career.
And Sullivan is optimistic that his challenges will
eventually bring some concrete results. If the way
judges are appointed and evaluated is changed, says
Sullivan, "the individuals appointed to the bench
would be different, and those individuals would have
absolutely no concern about anything negative
happening to their careers as a result of their
rulings."
But he and Young are aware they are trying to
shake the foundations of the military-justice system.
"In essence, what we're asking them to do is to
recuse themselves," says Young of the military
judges. "If we're to win, that means that this court
would have to shut down."
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92-1482 WEISS v. U.S.
Military prosecutions-Appointment of military
trial and appellate judges-Appointments Clause
-Due process.
Ruling as to petitioner Weiss (US CtMilApp,
36 MJ 224):
Judge advocate general's appointment of com-
missioned officers to serve as military trial and
appellate judges without Senate approval does
not violate Appointments Clause of Constitution;
servicemember's conviction for larceny of
racquetball glove is affirmed.
Ruling as to petitioner Hernandez (US CtMil
App, 2/25/93. unpublished):
Servicemember's conviction for smuggling 11
kilograms of cocaine is affirmed in light of U.S. v.
Weiss, 36 MJ 224 (US CtMilApp 1992).
Questions presented: (1) May judge advocate
general of armed force, who is not authorized to
make appointments under Appointments Clause,
appoint commissioned officers to serve as trial
and military appellate judges, on theory that
their appointment as commissioned officers al-
ready satisfies Appointments Clause for both
their judicial and non-judicial duties? (2) Does
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause require
that, in peacetime, military trial and appellate
judges be appointed to their judicial offices for
fixed terms?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/12/92, by Alan
B. Morrison, Eugene R. Fidell, and Fieldsman,
Tucker, Leifer, Fidell & Bank, all of Washing-
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92-1183 KNOX v. U.S.
Child pornography-"Exhibition" of genitals cov-
ered by clothing-Good-faith defense-Scienter
-Overbreadth.
Ruling below (CA 3, 977 F2d 815):
Videotapes focusing on genitalia and pubic
area of minor females constitute "exhibition of
genitals or pubic area" within meaning of federal
child pornography laws, 18 USC 2252(a)(2) and
(4) and 18 USC 2256(2)(E), even when those
body parts are covered by clothing; such exhibi-
tion is "lascivious," and thus forbidden by those
laws, if subjective inquiry leads to conclusion that
it is intended to elicit sexual response from view-
er; as so construed, statute is not overbroad in
violation of First Amendment; materials used in
marketing tapes and found in defendant's apart-
ment, along with defendant's own notations on
tape containers, showed that defendant knew gen-
eral character of tapes, which is all that is re-
quired by knowledge element of statute proscrib-
ing receipt and possession of child pornography.
Questions presented: (1) Can there be "exhibi-
tion of genitals or pubic area" under Section
2256(2)(E) under circumstances in which geni-
tals and pubic area are fully covered by article of
clothing? (2) Did government introduce suffi-
cient proof of scienter to support guilty verdict in
situation in which no other prosecution has ever
been brought and no other arrest has ever been
made charging exhibition of genitals fully cov-
ered by article of clothing, and defendant knew
that videotape contained no nudity and was told
that videotape was therefore legal? (3) Is objec-
tively reasonable, good-faith belief in legality of
depiction valid affirmative defense in this case?
(4) Assuming that there can be "exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area" under Section 2256(2)(E)
when genitals and pubic area are fully covered by
clothing, is statute unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/12/93, by Alan
Silber and Hayden Perle & Silber, both of Wee-
hawken, N.J., and Lawrence A. Stanley, of New
York, N.Y.
361
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. STEPHEN A. KNOX
No. 92-7089
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
977 F.2d 815; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26267
August 17, 1992, Argued
October 15, 1992, Filed
Cowen, Circuit Judge.
The principal question presented by this appeal is
whether videotapes that focus on the genitalia and
pubic area of minor females constitute an "exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area" under the federal child
pornography laws, 18 U.S.C. @ 2252(a)(2), (4)
(Supp. 1990); 18 U.S.C. @ 2256(2)(E) (1988), even
though these body parts are covered by clothing. We
hold that such visual depictions qualify as an
exhibition, and that this construction does not render
the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. Finally, we
conclude that the government presented sufficient
evidence at the bench trial to establish both the
necessary mens rea and the delivery of the films
through interstate mail. We thus will affirm the
conviction.
I.
In March of 1991, the U.S. Customs International
Branch intercepted a mailing to France which
contained a request that two videos, "Little Girl
Bottoms (Underside)" and "Little Blondes" be sent to
J. Richard Scott, 210 West Hamilton Avenue, No.
108, State College, PA. The parcel also contained a
check drawn on the account of Stephen Knox and
bearing his signature. The check listed his address as
210 East Hamilton Avenue, No. 25, State College,
PA. A second envelope addressed to J. Richard Scott
from the Netherlands also was confiscated and
contained a catalog advertising for sale videotapes
depicting nude, semi-clothed and clothed minors.
Aware that Knox previously had been convicted of
receiving child pornography through the mail, the
customs investigators obtained a search warrant and
with the assistance of the Pennsylvania State Police
searched his apartment.'
The police officers seized three video cassettes
produced by the Nather Company (hereafter "Nather
Tapes"), a videotape distribution company based in
Las Vegas, Nevada. A catalog from the Nather
Company with checkmarks by several video
selections was also removed from Knox's apartment.
One of the marked videos in the brochure
corresponded to a segment of a compilation tape
which was seized. Envelopes addressed to Nather and
Nather mail order forms were discovered as well as
a carbon copy of a money order payable to Nather
Company for an amount approximately equal to the
price of a single video.
The tapes contained numerous vignettes of teenage
and preteen females, between the ages of ten and
seventeen, striking provocative poses for the camera.
The children were obviously being directed by
someone off-camera. All of the children wore bikini
bathing suits, leotards, underwear or other
abbreviated attire while they were being filmed. The
government conceded that no child in the films was
nude, and that the genitalia and pubic areas of the
young girls were always concealed by an abbreviated
article of clothing. The photographer would zoom in
on the children's pubic and genital area and display
a close-up view for an extended period of time. Most
of the videotapes were set to music. The films them-
selves and the promotional brochures distributed by
Nather demonstrate that the video tapes clearly were
designed to pander to pedophiles. See infra typescript
at 5.
The United States prosecuted based exclusively on
the three Nather tapes. Knox was indicted on two
counts: (1) knowingly receiving through the mail
visual depictions of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct and (2) knowingly possessing three
or more videotapes that contain a visual depiction of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct in
violation of 18 U.S.C. @ 2252(a)(2) and (4).
Sexually explicit conduct for both of these offenses is
defined to include a "lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area." 18 U.S.C. @ 2256(2)(E).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
12(b), Knox filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the
indictment contending that the videos did not contain
an "exhibition" of the genitals or pubic area since
these areas were always covered by underwear, a
leotard or a bathing suit. Knox and the government
agreed to a pre-trial hearing to determine whether the
indictment was facially sufficient. The district judge
viewed portions of the Nather tapes which the parties
stipulated were representative of the material
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contained in the videos. To determine the meaning of
the statutory language, "exhibition of the pubic area",
the district court looked to the plain meaning of the
words. Since the pubic area is located directly
adjacent to the genitalia, the district court concluded
that other areas in close proximity to the genitals,
specifically the "uppermost portion of the inner
thigh", were also included in the statutory definition
of the pubic area. District Court Memorandum at 14;
App. at 41. Since the upper portion of the inner thigh
was clearly exposed, the court held that the tapes
contained an exhibition of the pubic area, and
therefore denied Knox's motion to dismiss the
indictment.
Knox waived his right to a jury trial and a bench
trial was held. At the bench trial, all of the exhibits
and testimony from the pre-trial hearing were
incorporated into the record for purposes of the trial.
Additionally, the government admitted into evidence
advertising catalogs from Nather, Nather mail order
forms, and envelopes addressed to the Nather
Company which were seized from Knox's apartment.
The catalogs described in detail the contents and
intended effect of the films that could be purchased:
'Sassy Sylphs' will blow your mind so completely
you'll be begging for mercy.
Just look at what we have in this incredible tape:
about 14 girls between the ages of 11 and 17 showing
so much panty and ass you'll get dizzy. There are
panties showing under shorts and under dresses and
skirts; there are boobs galore and T-back (thong)
bathing suits on girls as young as 15 that are so
revealing it's almost like seeing them naked (some
say even better).
District Court Memorandum at 11; App. at 38.
The government also introduced evidence to establish
that Nather mailed the tapes from its office in Nevada
to the mailbox which Knox had rented under a
fictitious name. Finally, the carbon copy of a
sixty-two dollar money order payable to Nather was
admitted to prove the method of payment. Although
Knox did not testify and called no defense witnesses,
he introduced magazine advertisements for Nather's
videotapes which claimed that the absence of
complete nudity rendered the tapes legal to purchase
and possess.
The district court found Knox guilty on both
counts. Thereafter, on February 13, 1992, Knox filed
a motion for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively,
as he styled it, an application for a hearing to explore
the anatomical issue decided by the court, predicated
upon the contention that the uppermost portion of the
inner thigh is not the pubic area. In conjunction with
this motion, Knox submitted the affidavit of Dr. Todd
Olsen, Director of Human Gross Anatomy at the
Albert Einstein College of Medicine. The affidavit of
Dr. Olsen stated that defining the pubic area to
encompass the uppermost portion of the inner thigh
is anatomically incorrect. Since the motion was filed
three months after entry of the verdict, the district
court denied the motion as untimely. Knox was
sentenced to the minimum mandatory term of
imprisonment of five years for each count, to be
served concurrently. He appealed from the denial of
the motion to dismiss the indictment, the guilty
verdict, and the denial of the post-trial motion for
judgment of acquittal.
II.
As a preliminary matter, we must resolve whether
this Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of the
post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) provides: "If the
jury returns a verdict of guilty . . ., a motion for
judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within
7 days after the jury is discharged or within such
further time as the court may fix during the 7-day
period." The time limit imposed on criminal
defendants by Rule 29(c) may only be extended by
court order, and a district court's refusal to consider
a motion which is not made within the specified
period is not error. United States v. Wright-Baker,
784 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Henshaw, 687 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
862 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1988). The district court
entered the verdict of guilty against Knox on
November 15, 1991. Knox's counsel failed to move
for a judgment of acquittal until February 13, 1992,
far beyond the seven-day period mandated by Rule
29. Although the district court had the power to rule
on Knox's belated motion, see United States v.
Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987), the
exercise of that power was discretionary and the
district judge chose to deny the motion as untimely.
The district court clearly acted within its
discretionary authority in refusing to reach the merits
of a motion filed three months after the entry of the
verdict. Knox seeks to appeal the substantive issues
raised by his motion forjudgment of acquittal. Since
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to entertain the motion, we
need not address the substance of that application.
We now turn to the remaining rulings before us: the
denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment and the
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entry of the guilty verdict.
I .
The Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977, as subsequently amended,
criminalizes knowingly receiving through the mail
visual depictions of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct and knowingly possessing three or
more videotapes which contain a visual depiction of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18
U.S.C. @ 2252(a)(2), (4). Sexually explicit conduct
for purposes of both of these offenses is defined to
include the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area." 18 U.S.C. @ 2256 (2)(E). Holding that
the indictment was facially sufficient, the district
court reasoned that the statutory requirement that
there be an exhibition of the pubic area was fulfilled
since the uppermost portion of the inner thigh is part
of the pubic area, and the upper thighs were clearly
exposed. Because the meaning of the terms "pubic
area" and "exhibition" under 18 U.S.C. @
2256(2)(E) poses a pure question of law, our review
is plenary. United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033,
1036 (3d Cir. 1988).
The district court's novel definition of the pubic
area is anatomically and legally incorrect. The most
widely accepted human anatomy treatises make clear
that the pubic area is entirely above the genitals and
not below or alongside that portion of the anatomy.
H. Gray, Gray's Anatomy, 90-91 (30th ed. 1985);
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 1533 (27th
ed. 1988). The uppermost portion of a female's
thighs is not contained in the pubic area as the district
court found. On its face, the statute criminalizes only
exhibitions of the genitals or the pubic area. It does
not prohibit depictions of body parts simply because
they are located in close proximity to the genitals.
Nor does the statute criminalize all visual images of
children which an individual may find sexually
arousing.
It is axiomatic that when the statutory language is
clear, the words must be interpreted in accordance
with their ordinary meaning. Malloy v. Eichler, 860
F.2d 1179, 1183 (3d Cir. 1988). Only the most
extraordinary showing of contrary congressional
intent may justify altering the plain meaning of a
statute. Id. No evidence was presented that Congress
intended to give the term "pubic area" a meaning
more expansive than its standard medical definition.
Even if the boundaries of the pubic area were
uncertain, the rule of lenity mandates that ambiguity
concerning the coverage of a criminal statute must be
resolved in favor of the criminal defendant until
Congress unequivocally states that the court has
misconstrued its scope. Crandon v. United States,
494 U.S. 152, 168, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1006, 108 L. Ed.
2d 132 (1990). The plain meaning of the statute
coupled with the rule of lenity require the legal
definition of "pubic area" to be confined to its
medically accepted meaning. Displaying any portion
of the inner thighs does not constitute an exhibition of
the pubic area under 18 U.S.C. @ 2256(2)(E).
IV.
Since the district court found that an exhibition
existed from the exposure of the upper inner thigh, it
refused to decide whether the filming of the
children's covered genitals and pubic area qualified as
an exhibition. Having adopted the medical definition
of the term "pubic area", we address the principal
issue on appeal, the interpretation of an "exhibition."
The government contends that the pictorial
representation of the genitals or pubic area, covered
only by underwear, a bikini bathing suit, a leotard or
other abbreviated attire constitutes an exhibition of
that body region. Defendant asserts that the genitals
or pubic area must be unclad or nude, and fully
exposed to the camera, before an exhibition may
occur.
When interpreting a statute, the starting point is
always the language of the statute itself. American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102
S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1982). Courts
presume that Congress expressed its legislative intent
through the ordinary meaning of the words it chose
to use, Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9, 82
S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962), and if the
statutory language is clear, it is not necessary to
glean congressional intent through an examination of
legislative history, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184
n. 29, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2296, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 n. 29
(1978); Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009, 1013 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S.Ct.
2126, 85 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1985). An extraordinary
showing of contrary congressional intent is necessary
to justify altering the plain meaning of a statutory
term. Malloy, 860 F.2d at 1183.
Knox attempts to read a nudity requirement into a
statute which has none. The amended Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act criminalizes
the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area." 18 U.S.C. @ 2256(2)(E) (1988). Exhibit
means "to present to view: show, display . . . to
show publicly: put on display in order to attract
notice to what is interesting or instructive." District
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Court Memorandum at 16 (quoting Webster's New
International Dictionary, Unabridged (1976)). The
genitals and pubic area of the young girls in the
Nather tapes were certainly "on display" as the
camera focused for prolonged time intervals on
close-up views of these body parts. Additionally, the
obvious purpose and inevitable effect of the videotape
was to "attract notice" specifically to the genitalia and
pubic area. Applying the plain meaning of the word
"exhibition" leads to the conclusion that nudity is not
a prerequisite for the occurrence of an exhibition.
Since the statutory language does not suggest that
a nude exhibition is necessary, Knox bears the burden
of demonstrating a clear contrary congressional intent
to warrant importing into the statute an unexpressed
requirement. See Malloy, 860 F.2d at 1183. An
examination of the relevant legislative history,
however, strengthens not undermines our construction
of the statutory language. The legislative proposal
before the original child pornography statute was
enacted in 1977 would have proscribed "nudity,
which nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual
stimulation or gratification of any individual who may
view such depiction." S. 1011, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1977). Clearly, Congress understood how to limit
the statute's scope to encompass only nude displays.
Since Congress considered including nudity as an
element of a criminal depiction, the decision to
eliminate this requirement must be deemed
intentional. When Congress passed the 1977 Act
prohibiting a "lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of any person", it must have desired to
criminalize both clothed and unclothed visual images
of a child's genitalia if they were lewd.' Appellant
relies on a letter from the Justice Department
outlining its views concerning S. 1001, the original
proposed bill (containing the nudity language), as
evidence that Congress assumed that an exhibition
meant a nude exhibition. [citations ommited] After
suggesting that "lewd exhibition of the genitals"
replace the proposed language, the Assistant Attorney
General from the Justice Department stated
"Congress could make clear in the legislative history
of the bill what types of nude portrayals of children
were intended to be encompassed within this
definition." Id. The letter assumes that Congress only
desired to prohibit nude exhibitions because at that
time the language of the proposed bill included the
word "nudity." By subsequently eliminating the word
"nudity," Congress appears to have repudiated its
earlier intention to confine the statute's coverage to
nude exhibitions. Further, Congress failed to
articulate anywhere in its extensive legislative history
any desire that the statute, as enacted, prohibit only
nude portrayals.'
The underlying rationale for the federal child
pornography laws also supports the conclusion that
clothed exhibitions of the genitalia are proscribed.
When an obscenity statute is challenged as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court balances the government's interest in
protecting the sensibilities of unwilling recipients
from exposure to pornography against the dangers of
government censorship. Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973).
Because the government interest, although legitimate,
is not compelling, regulation of obscene materials is
limited to works which "appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Id. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615.
The Supreme Court allows the states and Congress
greater leeway to regulate and proscribe pornography
that depicts minors as distinguished from adults since
the harmful effects suffered by a child are palpably
more severe. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982).
The Court relaxes the Miller obscenity test when
pornographic material portrays minors since the
government's interest in "safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor" is
"compelling." Id. at 756-57, 102 S.Ct. at 3354
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2620, 73 L. Ed.
2d 248 (1982)). The use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the
physiological, emotional and mental health of the
child. [cites ommited]. The psychological effect of
visually recording the sexual exploitation of a child is
devastating and its elimination of "surpassing
importance." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757, 102 S.Ct. at
3355. Since the child's image is permanently
recorded, the pornography may haunt him or her for
a lifetime because the child will be aware that the
offensive photograph or film is circulating through
the masses. Id. at 759 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 3355 n. 10
(quoting Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation
of Children: A Model Act, 17 Wake Forest L. Rev.
535, 545 (1981)). The crime is the affront to the
dignity and privacy of the child and the invasion of
the child's vulnerability:
Human dignity is offended by the
pornographer. American law does not
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protect all human dignity; legally, an adult
can consent to its diminishment. When a
child is made the target of the
pornographer-photographer, the statute will
not suffer the insult to the human spirit, that
the child should be treated as a thing.
U.S. v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856, 108 S.Ct. 164, 98 L. Ed.
2d 118 (1987). Additionally, controlling the
production and dissemination of child pornography is
of paramount importance since pedophiles often use
child pornography to seduce other children into
performing sexual acts. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111,
110 S.Ct. at 1697.
To vindicate the compelling government interest in
protecting the safety and welfare of children, not only
is the spectrum of constitutionally unprotected
pornographic material broader when the subjects are
children rather than adults, but also the arsenal of
available enforcement mechanisms is more extensive.
For instance, the mere possession of child
pornography, even in one's home, may be
criminalized although only distribution of obscenity
depicting adults can be proscribed. Compare Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1249,
22 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1969) (Georgia statute outlawing
private possession of obscenity violates the First
Amendment) with Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108, 110
S.Ct. at 1695-97 (Ohio statute criminalizing
possession of child pornography upheld against First
Amendment challenge due to the compelling interest
in protecting minors).
The harm Congress attempted to eradicate by
enacting the child pornography laws is present when
a photographer unnaturally focuses on a minor child's
clothed genital area with the obvious intent to
produce an image sexually arousing to pedophiles.
The child is treated as a sexual object and the
permanent record of this embarrassing and
humiliating experience produces the same detrimental
effects to the mental health of the child as a nude
portrayal. The rationale underlying the statute's
proscription applies equally to any lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area whether these
areas are clad or completely exposed.
Knox next asserts that our decision in U.S. v.
Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989), mandates that
the genitals or pubic area be exposed before an
exhibition may occur. In Villard, we stated that
"more than merely nudity" was required for a
violation of the statute; otherwise, "inclusion of the
term 'lascivious' would be meaningless." Id. at 121.
The requirement of more than mere nudity does not
mean, as Knox contends, that nudity is a prerequisite
to the existence of an exhibition; rather Villard
simply stated the obvious principle that nudity alone
is insufficient to constitute a lascivious exhibition. No
one seriously could think that a Renoir painting of a
nude woman or a family snapshot of a naked child in
the bathtub violates the child pornography laws.
Nudity must be coupled with other circumstances that
make the visual depiction lascivious or sexually
provocative in order to fall within the parameters of
the statute. Such was our holding in Villard, which
addressed whether sufficient evidence existed to
justify a finding of lasciviousness.
Villard is not only consistent with our
interpretation of an exhibition, but supports this
construction. The Villard Court outlined six factors
which should be analyzed to determine whether an
exhibition is lascivious:
1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is
on the child's genitalia or pubic area;
2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is
sexually suggestive, i.e. in a place or pose generally
associated with sexual activity;
3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose,
or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the
child;
4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or
nude;
5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual
coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity;
6) whether the visual depiction is intended or
designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.
Id. at 122 (quoting United States v. Dost, 636
F.Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom.,
United States v. Wiegand, supra.
The analysis is qualitative and no single factor is
dispositive. Id. The inclusion of the fourth factor
rests on the implicit assumption that a clothed
exhibition of the genitals is criminalized under the
statute. Since whether a child is fully clothed,
partially clothed or naked is one of several factors to
be weighed to determine whether an exhibition is
lascivious, it follows that an exhibition may occur
when a child is fully or partially clothed.
366
Having analyzed the language of the statute, its
legislative history, the underlying rationale for the
federal child pornography laws and relevant case law,
we conclude that nude exposure of the genitals or
pubic area is not necessary for an exhibition to take
place.
V.
Interpreting an "exhibition" of the genitals or pubic
area to include a clothed display of these areas does
not render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.'
The function of the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine is to prevent broadly worded statutes which
control constitutionally unprotected conduct from
deterring constitutionally protected expression.
Invalidating a statute as overbroad, however, is an
exceptional remedy and should be employed sparingly
and only as a last resort since it is "strong medicine."
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct.
2908, 2916, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973). Before a child
pornography statute is declared unconstitutional, the
overbreadth must "not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep." Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2918. The
requirement of substantial overbreadth is equally
applicable to challenges that arise in defense of a
criminal prosecution. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772-74,
102 S.Ct. at 3363. In Ferber, the Supreme Court
held that the New York statute which criminalized the
"lewd exhibition of the genitals" was not
constitutionally overbroad. Id. Although some
protected expression, ranging from medical textbooks
to National Geographic photographs, could possibly
be reached by the statute, this tiny fraction of
materials within the statute's coverage could be
protected by case-by-case analysis. Id.
Knox's prediction that our interpretation of an
exhibition will result in prosecutors leafing through
family albums and church bulletins containing
innocent pictures of fully clothed children and
pressing charges is unfounded. Although our
interpretation of an exhibition is expansive, the
limiting principle in the statute is the requirement of
lasciviousness.' A visual depiction of a child,
whether the child is clothed or naked, must be
lascivious to be proscribed. Whether a depiction is
lascivious is essentially a subjective inquiry into
whether or not the material is intended to elicit a
sexual response from the viewer. Villard, 885 F.2d
at 122. Only a minuscule fraction of all pictures of
minor children will be sufficiently sexually suggestive
and unnaturally focused on the genitalia to qualify as
lascivious. Even fewer images where a minor's
genital area is not fully exposed will constitute a
lascivious exhibition since the fact that a child's
genital area is covered is a factor militating against a
finding of lasciviousness. Thus, including scantily
clothed displays of the genitals within the meaning of
an exhibition leaves the statute "directed at the hard
core of child pornography," Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773,
102 S.Ct. at 3363, which results in leaving an
indelible psychological scar on the exploited child.
Our interpretation simply declines to create an
absolute immunity for pornographers who pander to
pedophiles by using as their subjects children whose
genital areas are barely covered.
VI.
Knox contends that insufficient evidence was
presented at trial for a trier of fact to have found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) the Nather tapes
traveled through the mail in interstate commerce; and
(2) Knox "knowingly" received child pornography
through the mail and "knowingly" possessed three
pornographic videotapes. Generally, this Court must
examine the evidence as a whole in the light most
favorable to the government, and must sustain a
conviction if there is substantial evidence to support
it. If a defendant fails to file a timely motion for
judgment of acquittal, however, we must review the
sufficiency of the evidence only for plain error. Since
Knox's motion for judgment of acquittal was untimely
(see discussion supra section II), we must determine
if the district court committed plain error in reaching
its challenged findings. At least one court of appeals
has held that this semantic distinction does not alter
the analysis because the plain error test and the
sufficiency of the evidence standard are essentially
equivalent inquiries. See United States v. Bowie, 892
F.2d 1494, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990) (although the plain
error rule was applicable "the standard actually
applied is essentially the same as if there had been a
timely motion for acquittal"); 2 Steven A. Childress,
Federal Standards of Review @ 9.12 (2d ed. 1992).
We need not determine the precise boundaries of the
plain error test since the government fulfilled the
more stringent standard - there was sufficient
evidence to support the district court's finding that
the Nather tapes traveled though the mail and that
Knox knowingly received and possessed those films.
To establish interstate mailing, the government
introduced evidence that Knox rented a mailbox
under a fictitious name and that he received other
pornographic materials at that mailbox. When agents
searched Knox's apartment pursuant to a valid search
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warrant, they discovered advertisements from Nather
with checkmarks by several video tapes and
envelopes, pre-addressed to Nather, with forms to
order Nather tapes. One of the videos marked in the
catalog was included as a segment of a compilation
tape found in Knox's apartment. A carbon copy of a
$ 62 money order payable to Nather was also seized
from Knox's apartment. Sixty-two dollars is the
approximate price of a single Nather tape. Knox is
correct that the government never introduced direct
evidence that Nather mailed tapes to Knox's rented
mailbox. A trier of fact, however, may consider
direct and circumstantial evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. The above facts
provide strong circumstantial support that Nather, a
Nevada mail order video company without any
offices in Pennsylvania, at some point utilized the
postal system to cause the tapes it distributes to be
discovered in Knox's apartment in Pennsylvania. We
cannot say that it was plain error to conclude that the
Nather tapes traveled through the mail.
The district court also did not commit plain error
by finding that Knox "knowingly" received and
possessed the Nather tapes. Knox maintains that the
absence of nudity in the films and the disclaimers in
the Nather brochures that the videos were legal to
purchase and own disproves the mens rea element of
section 2252. We have previously held that the mens
rea requirement of section 2252 "does not require
that a recipient of child pornography know the
precise contents of such materials." United States v.
Brown, 862 F.2d 1033, 1036 (3d Cir. 1988). In
Brown, the defendant ordered one film, but
accidentally received a different tape. Since the
defendant knew the video he requested was child
pornography, we deemed it irrelevant that he did not
know the exact contents of the substituted tape
actually mailed to him.
Knox's argument in this case is somewhat
different. He claims that although he knew the
contents of the Nather tapes, he was unaware that the
videos were child pornography and believed they
were legal to own. To address this contention, we
look to the Supreme Court's interpretation of a
strikingly similar statute for guidance. To fulfill the
"knowingly" requirement of 18 U.S.C. @ 1461 (the
obscenity law concerning adults), the Supreme
Court held that the prosecution need only show that
the defendant had knowledge of the contents,
character and nature of the materials. Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123, 94 S.Ct. 2887,
2910, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974). To require proof that
the defendant knew the materials were obscene, and
thus illegal to distribute, would allow defendants to
avoid prosecution by claiming ignorance of the
relevant law. Id. It would be ironic to construe the
same word, knowingly, in the analogous child
pornography law as more lenient to criminal
defendants since the purpose for enacting the child
pornography statute was to create more stringent
regulation for child pornography than already existed
through the generally applicable obscenity laws.
Therefore, to fulfill the knowledge element of section
2252, a defendant simply must be aware of the
general nature and character of the material and need
not know that the portrayals are illegal. See United
States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1989)
(no need to prove knowledge of illegality under
section 2252); United States v. Tolczeki, 614 F.Supp.
1424, 1429 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (same).' The child
pornography laws would be eviscerated if a
pedophile's personal opinion about the legality of
sexually explicit videos was transformed into the
applicable law.
There is no doubt that Knox was aware of the
nature of the Nather tapes when he received them.
Newsletters from Nather found in Knox's apartment
described the contents of the films, "girls between the
ages of 11 and 17 showing so much panty and ass
you'll get dizzy . . . so revealing it's almost like
seeing them naked", and the video's intended effects,
"Sassy Sylphs will blow your mind so completely
you'll be begging for mercy." Knox handwrote his
own descriptions of the Nather films on the outside of
the boxes. For instance, on the Nather II tape, Knox
wrote "13-year old flashes" followed by "hot." Knox
characterizes the second vignette as "15 year old
shows nipple." Both Nather's and Knox's descriptions
of the tapes clearly demonstrate that Knox was aware
that the videotapes contained sexually oriented
materials designed to sexually arouse a pedophile.
Sufficient evidence was presented at the bench trial to
support a finding that Knox was aware of the nature
of the Nather tapes, and therefore knowingly
possessed and received them.
Even if a reasonable mistake as to the legality of
the material was recognized as a defense, the
language of the statute is clear that nudity is not a
prerequisite for a lascivious exhibition. Additionally,
relying on Nather's disclaimer is tantamount to asking
a hard core pornographer for legal advice as to
whether the material he earns a living by selling is
legal. Nather's disclaimer could not reasonably lead
Knox to believe that the videotapes were legal. If
anything, the need to profess legality should have
alerted Knox to the films' dubious legality.
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VII.
In sum, we hold that an "exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. @ 2256(2)(E)
encompasses visual depictions of a child's genitals or
pubic area even when these areas are covered by an
article of clothing. Our construction of the statutory
language does not render the statute unconstitutionally
overbroad since the requirement of lasciviousness
limits the proscribed depictions to constitutionally
unprotected expression. Finally, the district court did
not commit plain error when it determined that the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Knox knowingly
received and possessed the videotapes and that the
films traveled through interstate mail. The judgment
of conviction will therefore be affirmed.
ENDNOTES
1. The district court determined that the search
of Knox's apartment did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, and Knox does not contest this decision
on appeal.
2. A subsequent amendment, the Child
Protection Act of 1984, replaced "lewd" with the
word "lascivious", but the two words have identical
meanings. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239,
1243 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856, 108
S.Ct. 164, 98 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1987).
3. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-910, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5952-59; S. Rep. No. 98-169, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492; H.R.
Rep. No. 98-536, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1983); S.
Rep. No. 95-438, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40-68; H.R. Rep.
No. 95-696, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69-71; H.R. Coaf. Rep.
99-910, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977).
4. The term "pubic area" cannot be challenged
as vague or overbroad since Knox contends, and we
agree, that this phrase describes a precise anatomical
region.
5. The issue is not raised in this case, but we
note that although the meaning of lasciviousness is far
from crystal clear, it is not unconstitutionally vague
or overbroad. See United States v. O'Malley, 854
F.2d 1085, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 1988); Wiegand, 812
F.2d at 1243.
6. Title 18 U.S.C. @ 1461 (1988) provides in
pertinent part: "Whoever knowingly uses the mails
for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of
anything declared by this section . . . to be
nonmailable . .. shall be fined. . . ."
7. Since it was not raised, we reserve for
another day the issue of whether a defendant must
know that the subjects of the photograph or film are
minors. Although section 2252 does not require that
the defendant know the age of the minor, some courts
have held that the First Amendment dictates that
defendants be entitled to establish reasonable mistake
of age as an affirmative defense. See United States v.
United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist of Cal., 858
F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
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92-989 TENNESSEE v. MIDDLEBROOKS
Capital punishment-Aggravating circum-
stances-Felony murder-Killing during commis-
sion of felony.
Ruling below (Tenn SupCt, 840 SW2d 317, 52
CrL 1084):
Basing death sentence in felony-murder pros-
ecution on aggravating circumstance that killing
was committed during perpetration of felony is
duplicative of conviction that makes death sen-
tence possible and thus does not sufficiently nar-
row class of death-eligible murderers as required
by state and federal constitutional prohibitions of
cruel and unusual punishment.
Question presented: Does Eighth Amendment
prohibit sentencer in capital felony-murder pros-
ecution from considering as aggravating circum-
stance fact that murder was committed in perpe-
tration of felony?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/7/92, by
Charles W. Burson, Tenn. Atty. Gen. and Re-
porter, and Kathy M. Principe and Rebecca L.
Gundt, Asst. Attys. Gen.
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TENNESSEE v. MIDDLEBROOKS
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE, AT NASHVILLE
840 S.W.2d 317; 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 563
September 8, 1992, Filed
In this capital case, the defendant, Donald Ray
Middlebrooks, was found guilty of first-degree felony
murder and aggravated kidnapping, but found not
guilty of premeditated first-degree murder, armed
robbery, and aggravated sexual battery. In the
sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating
circumstances: (1) that the murder was heinous,
atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture; and (2)
that it was committed while defendant was engaged in
committing a felony. Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-2-203(i)(5) and (7)(1982). The jury found the
aggravating circumstances sufficiently substantial to
outweigh the mitigating circumstances and sentenced
the defendant to death by electrocution. The
defendant was also sentenced to 60 years for
aggravated kidnapping.
On appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues
for our review, which involve alleged errors
occurring at trial in both the guilt and sentencing
phases. We have carefully considered the
defendant's contentions as to the guilt phase and find
no error. We, therefore, affirm the defendant's
guilt.' With respect to the sentence, we wish to
address an issue not directly raised by the parties -
the constitutionality of the death penalty as
punishment for felony murder. A majority of the
Court - Justices Anderson, Drowota, and O'Brien -
conclude that it is constitutional under both the state
and federal constitutions to impose the death penalty
for felony murder under Tennessee's death penalty
statute. Justices Daughtrey and Reid dissent. A
majority of the Court - Justices Anderson,
Daughtrey, and Reid - have determined, however,
that the statute as applied in this case does not
sufficiently narrow the population of death-eligible
felony murder defendants under the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I,
@ 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, because the
aggravating circumstance set forth in Tenn. Code
Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(7)(1982), that the defendant was
engaged in committing a felony, essentially duplicates
the elements of the offense of first-degree felony
murder set out in Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-2-202(a)(1982) and Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-2-202(a)(1)(Supp. 1988). Justices Drowota and
O'Brien dissent.
As a result of this determination and because the
jury has found two aggravating circumstances are
supported by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is necessary for this case to be remanded for
resentencing. Although the evidence amply supports
the aggravating circumstance found by the jury that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind,
Tenn. Code Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(5), we are unable to
conclude that the elimination of the other aggravating
circumstance (i)(7) from jury consideration is
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. We,
therefore, reverse the sentence on the grounds that
the aggravating circumstance set out in Tenn. Code
Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(7) is unconstitutionally applied
under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Article I, @ 16 of the Tennessee Constitution
where the death penalty is imposed for felony
murder, and remand this case for a resentencing
hearing, in which the State will be free to reseek the
death penalty if it so desires.
Under our holding today, felony murder continues
as a death-eligible offense. It requires,. however, a
finding of one of the eleven other aggravating
circumstances other than the duplicative circumstance
of Tenn. Code Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(7).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The State's proof introduced at the guilt phase of
the trial demonstrated that on the evening of Sunday,
April 26, 1987, around 7:00 p.m., the victim,
Kerrick Majors, a 14-year-old black male, was with
four friends on Gallatin Road in East Nashville,
Tennessee, when they saw a table with a "lot of
stuff" being set up across the street as a flea market
by three homeless street persons: the defendant,
Donald Middlebrooks (a 24-year-old white male); his
wife, 17-year-old Tammy Middlebrooks; and their
companion, 16-year-old Roger Brewington. The five
boys ran across Gallatin Road and were looking at
the flea market when Tammy Middlebrooks called
out, "Hey, leave our stuff alone!" The boys started
running. The defendant and Brewington chased them
until they caught Majors. Brewington grabbed
Majors in a "sleeper hold" around his neck and head.
The defendant held his hand. When Majors said,
"Hey man, you know me," Brewington responded,
"Shut up, you nigger." Shannon Stewart and another
of the boys, Tony Watson, saw the two men drag
Majors toward the table and observed the defendant
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strike him in the face, knocking him to the ground.
Frightened, the boys took off running. Later that
evening, they reported these events to the victim's
mother, who called the police.
The next afternoon, Kerrick Majors' nude body
was discovered lying face up in a dry creek bed
under a foam mattress in a heavily wooded area
behind a drugstore on Gallatin Road in the area
where the defendant and Brewington had caught
Majors. A bloodstained T-shirt was tied around his
neck. A red rope belt was tied around Majors' left
wrist, and there was a two-inch laceration in his right
wrist. Abrasions, swelling, and bruising were
present on the victim's head, his left eye, his nose,
his lips, and inside his mouth. An "X" with a
vertical line running through it had been cut into his
chest. The forensic pathologist, Dr. Charles Harlan,
testified that these incisions had been made while
Majors was alive. There were two deep stab wounds
in the center of the body. One of these penetrated
the left lung and pulmonary artery and caused the
victim to bleed to death over a period of ten to thirty
minutes, during part of which Majors was conscious.
Investigating officers noticed a smell of urine about
the face, and there were bruises and skinned areas on
the back. A wooden stick with blood stains on one
end was found lying close to the victim's head.
Around 1:10 a.m. on April 28, police investigators
met Brewington at a doughnut shop several miles
from the Gallatin Road area. Brewington directed the
officers to the location of a knife with a brass
knuckle handle, which was bloodstained. Dr. Harlan
testified that this knife could have inflicted the deep
stab wounds on the victim's body. Brewington also
directed the police to a wooded area between Gallatin
Road and Ellington Parkway in Nashville where,
around 7:00 a.m. on April 28, Donald and Tammy
Middlebrooks were apprehended at a small plywood
shack. The defendant, who resisted the arresting
officers, had a knife with him. He was arrested with
the aid of police dogs, taken to the hospital for
treatment of the dog bites, and later transported to
police headquarters.
At 12:30 p.m. that day, the defendant gave a
lengthy video-taped statement about his involvement
in the death of Kerrick Majors. The defendant
admitted participating in the beating and mistreatment
of Majors, but described his role as minor and
depicted Roger Brewington as the primary perpetrator
of the offense. After Majors was caught,
Middlebrooks said Brewington suggested they "have
some fun," and the three of them took Majors back
into the woods. His hands were tied. Brewington
slapped him, beat him with the knife's brass
knuckles, hit him with a stick, and urinated into his
mouth. The defendant admitted striking Majors with
his open hand and on the leg with a switch.
Defendant said that his wife Tammy had slapped
Majors and burned Majors' nose with a cigarette
lighter as Brewington urged her on. Brewington hit
Majors on his testicles, threatened to cut "it" open,
stuck a stick up Majors' anus, hit him some more
with the brass knuckles, wiped the victim's blood on
himself, beat his mouth and tongue with a stick,
dropped the knife on him, gagged him, and slashed
his wrist. Finally, when the defendant asked
Brewington to stop because the victim's crying and
pleading were getting on his nerves, Brewington gave
the victim "the kiss of death" on the forehead.
Brewington then gave the defendant the knife and told
him to stab Majors. When the defendant refused,
Brewington stabbed Majors. The defendant then
reluctantly stabbed the victim, according to him, "to
prove to Roger that I guess I was cooler" and to put
Majors out of his misery. In a previous statement,
however, the defendant had said that he had stabbed
Majors twice. The victim's ordeal began at 7:30 p.m.
and ended at 11:00 p.m. that night with the stabbing.
The next day, the defendant said he and
Brewington went back to where they had left the
body. Brewington kicked it and made the "X"
lacerations at this time. The defendant said he then
covered Majors with a foam mattress. The defendant
admitted that before beating and killing Majors, he
and Brewington had drunk alcohol and smoked
marijuana.
The defendant presented no proof.
Based on this evidence, the jury found the
defendant guilty of first-degree murder in the
perpetration of a felony and aggravated kidnapping,
but not guilty of premeditated first-degree murder,
armed robbery, or aggravated sexual battery.
In the sentencing phase of the trial, the state
incorporated the evidence presented at the guilt phase
and introduced photographs of the victim's body and
of Roger Brewington. The defendant's main theory
was that he was mentally ill and that infliction of
prolonged torture like that perpetrated on the victim
was inconsistent with his personality. His younger
half-sister, Sharon Fuchs, described their deprived
and unstable childhood growing up in Texas.
According to her, the defendant's father had died
when he was four, and he had been subjected to
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mistreatment by his mother's husbands and
boyfriends. The crucial change in his personality,
however, had occurred after he was sodomized in his
early teens by an adult male cousin who had been
baby-sitting him and his sister. After that, his grades
dropped at school, he began to run away from home,
and becoming emotionally disturbed, was committed
to the Waco State Home for Children but ran away
from that institution. Eventually, defendant was
imprisoned for his role in stealing a combine. While
confined, he was stabbed in the head with an ice
pick. He then began having grand mal seizures. The
defendant had a history of admissions to mental
hospitals and mental health facilities in Texas. His
sister described him as passive and nonviolent and
related how they had been cared for by a black
woman, whom the defendant had loved. She said her
brother had had black friends and was not a racist.
In Fuchs' cross-examination, the state introduced
a document written by Middlebrooks entitled
"Debow's Revenge," in which the defendant listed
Texas law enforcement officers upon whom he
planned vengeance for their offenses against him. In
a section called "Justified Death Plan," the defendant
described the tortures he intended to inflict upon
these persons. Fuchs explained that the document
was written after the defendant had been released in
May 1986 from the Austin State Hospital, where he
had been undergoing psychiatric treatment, and
testified that her brother had never acted on the
threats in the document.
Dr. Jay Woodman, a clinical psychologist, also
testified that he had interviewed, tested, and
evaluated the defendant. He diagnosed the defendant
as suffering from a severe borderline personality
disorder, with a secondary diagnosis of an adjustment
disorder with depressed mood, malingering,
polysubstance abuse, antisocial personality disorder,
and a seizure disorder by history. Dr. Woodman
described the defendant as a passive follower,
impulsive, and unable to engage in inflicting torture
for any protracted period of time. Dr. Woodman said
the defendant's intelligence was in the low-average
category, and that he had reviewed "Debow's
Revenge" and thought that it was consistent with the
fantasies generated by the intense inner-personal
anger of someone suffering from a borderline
personality disorder. Dr. Woodman felt that with the
proper medication, the defendant could behave in the
structured environment of a prison if given a life
sentence.
Based on the proof, the jury found the existence of
two aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury found that (1) the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it
involved torture or depravity of mind, Tenn. Code
Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(5)(1982), and that (2) the murder
was committed while the defendant was engaged in
committing a felony, Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-2-203(i)(7)(1982). In addition, the jury found that
the two aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances. As a result, the jury
sentenced the defendant to death.
PART H1.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PENALTY FOR FELONY MURDER
DEATH
The final issue raised on this appeal is whether the
trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion
to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the death
penalty is unconstitutional. The defendant challenges
the death penalty itself as cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and Article I, @ 16 of the Tennessee
Constitution. We find no merit to this argument. It
has been considered and rejected many times by this
Court.
Although the defendant has not directly raised the
issue, we wish to address the issue of the
constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty statute
as punishment for felony murder. A majority of the
present Court has held that the death penalty per se
does not violate Article I, @ 16 of the Tennessee
Constitution, see State v. Black, supra, 815 S.W.2d
at 189-91, but we have not yet considered the issue
of the constitutionality of the death penalty as
punishment for felony murder.
The imposition of the death penalty for the crime
of murder has a long history of acceptance both in
the United States and in England. The common-law
rule imposed a mandatory death sentence on all
convicted murderers. And the penalty continued to be
used into the 20th century by most American States,
although the breadth of the common-law rule was
diminished, initially by narrowing the class of.
murderers to be punished by death and subsequently
by widespread adoption of laws expressly granting
juries the discretion to recommend mercy.
In Tennessee, under the pre-1989 law, first-degree
murder was defined as follows:
every murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying
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in wait, or by other kinds of willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated killing, or committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
murder in the first degree, arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the
unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb....
Tenn. Code Ann. @ 39-2-202(a)(1982 & Supp.
1988).
With the exception of the inclusion of different
underlying felonies over the years, the so-called
felony murder statute remains essentially the same as
that enacted in @ 3 of Chapter 23 of the Public Acts
of 1829.2 The 1829 Act was modeled on the
Pennsylvania Act of 1794, 1794 Pa. Laws, ch. 1766,
@ 2, which divided the common-law offense of
murder into two degrees in order to achieve
proportionality in punishment and to restrict the
imposition of the death penalty.
Under Tennessee's statutory definition of felony
murder, prior to the 1989 Code Revision, the
prosecution is not required to prove the elements of
malice, deliberation and premeditation, or that the
defendant intended to kill the victim. Instead, where
the offense is committed in the perpetration of a
designated felony, the elements of malice,
deliberation and premeditation are implied. See State
v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 671 (Tenn. 1988); State
v. Norris, 684 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1984) .3
The Tennessee offense extends both to the killer
and his accomplices. A defendant who is a willing
and active participant in a robbery becomes
accountable for all of the consequences flowing from
the robbery and may be convicted of first-degree
murder where a co-perpetrator of the felony is the
actual killer.
The result of the felony murder doctrine in
Tennessee is thus to impose a rule of strict liability
allowing the underlying felonious intent to supply the
required mens rea for the homicidal actus reus and to
impose vicarious liability for the acts of another.
See, generally, Comment, The Constitutionality of
Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15
Hous. L. Rev. 356, 366-369 (1978). Therefore,
Tennessee's statute allows convictions for first-degree
felony murder of those who commit accidental
killings, and of persons who did not kill the victim
and may not have intended that the victim be killed
or suffer any physical harm.
Courts have often stated that the purpose of the
felony murder rule is to deter felons from
accidentally or negligently killing in the course of
felonies by holding them strictly liable for the results
of their dangerous conduct. Consistent with that
purpose, many courts have limited the scope of the
rule to felonies that are dangerous to human life."
The felony murder doctrine has been frequently
and negatively criticized by courts and legal
commentators, the criticism by commentators
becoming even more intense when felony murder is
used to make a defendant death eligible.
As more refined standards of culpability have
developed, some courts and commentators have said
that the intent to commit a felony is not equivalent to
the other mental states associated with murder. See
W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal
Law, @ 71, at 554 (1972). As a result of this and
other criticisms, some jurisdictions have abolished
the felony murder rule by statute or by judicial
action.5
Nonetheless, the vast majority of states that have
the death penalty permit it to be imposed in cases of
felony murder under some circumstances. Few
legislatures have repealed the doctrine, and the courts
have generally continued to enforce it. There are
thirty-six states which allow the imposition of the
death penalty, and thirty-two of these states allow the
death penalty for felony murder. Most states impose
the death penalty only where killings perpetrated
during felonies are intentional, deliberate, purposeful
or knowing. The number of states allowing capital
punishment for pure felony murder, or felony murder
simpliciter, is a distinct minority. Tennessee moved
out of that status in 1989 by amending its first-degree
murder statute to provide that first-degree murder
occurs only where a killing in the perpetration of one
of the listed felonies is reckless. See Tenn. Code
Ann. @ 39-13-202(a)(2)(1991). 6
The minimum standards for determining whether
a sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed
under the United States Constitution for felony
murder are indicated by the United States Supreme
Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.
Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed.
2d 127 (1987), which dealt with the problem of
imposing the death penalty in cases of vicarious
liability for felony murder, i.e., where an accomplice
in the felony, one who did not actually kill the
victim, is convicted of murder under the felony
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murder doctrine and receives the death penalty.
Under the rules of those cases, the death penalty
is only permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments for one who himself kills, attempts to
kill, or intends that a killing take place or that lethal
force will be imposed, Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797,
102 S. Ct. at 3376, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1151, or for one
whose personal involvement in the underlying felony
is substantial and who exhibits a reckless disregard or
indifference to the value of human life - although
there is no intent to kill, Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58,
107 S. Ct. at 1687-88, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 144.
These federal standards do not, however, answer
the question under the state constitution. As Justice
Brock observed in his dissent in State v. Dicks, 615
S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn. 1981), we may not impinge
upon the minimum level of protection established by
Supreme Court interpretations of the federal
constitutional guarantee, but may impose higher
standards and stronger protections than those set by
the federal constitution.
The present Court first examined the
constitutionality of the imposition of capital
punishment under Article I, @ 16 of the state
constitution in State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166
(Tenn. 1991). There, we elected to follow the
analysis of Gregg v. Georgia, supra, under which
three inquiries are required:
First, does the punishment for the crime conform
with the contemporary standards of decency?
Second, is the punishment grossly disproportionate to
the offense? Third, does the punishment go beyond
what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate,
penological objective?
State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 169, 524 A.2d 188,
210 (1987) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
173, 96 S.Ct. at 2925, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 874-75).
In Black, a majority of the present Court
reaffirmed the prior holdings of this Court that the
death penalty does not per se violate Article 1, @ 16,
of the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at
190-91. As a part of our analysis, we said that the
legislative and constitutional history of Tennessee
indicates a clear intent that the death penalty is, in
some cases, an appropriate form of punishment, and
that by reason of the language of the Constitution, the
framers recognized the acceptability of capital
punishment. Id., 815 S.W.2d at 188. In addition, we
noted that nothing in the constitutional legislative
history mandates that death is invalid per se as cruel
and unusual punishment under Article I, @ 16. Id.
In determining whether the death penalty conforms
with contemporary standards of decency for the crime
of felony murder, we recognize that an assessment of
contemporary values is relevant and that the standards
of decency are not static, but are evolving as society
matures. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78
S. Ct. 590, 598, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642 (1958). As
Gregg v. Georgia teaches, this assessment of
contemporary values is not subjective, but .an
examination of objective indicia that reflect the public
attitude towards a given sanction. 428 U.S. at 173,
96 S. Ct. at 2925, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 874.
It is evident that a large proportion of Tennessee
society continues to find the death penalty for felony
murder an appropriate and necessary criminal
sanction. This approval is clearly evidenced by the
actions of the General Assembly in re-enacting the
1977 felony murder statute after the 1972 decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed.
2d 346 (1972), and our own state court decisions
declaring the prior statute allowing the death penalty
unconstitutional. See Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d
643 (Tenn. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v.
Tennessee, 434 U.S. 905, 98 S. Ct. 303, 54 L. Ed.
2d 192 (1977); State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712
(Tenn. 1974). The General Assembly's response to
these court actions was to enact new statutes
addressing the concerns expressed by the Furman
court, but which continued to provide for the death
penalty for felony murder. Legislatures of at least
thirty-four other states took similar actions. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-80, 96 S. Ct. at
2928, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 878. As recently as 1989, the
General Assembly reaffirmed that position. See
Revised Criminal Code of 1989, 1989 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 591, @ 1.
Examination of other state systems reveals that
capital punishment for felony murder in some
circumstances is acceptable in at least thirty-two of
the thirty-six states with the death penalty. Finkel,
Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and
Community Sentiment, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. at 890. In
four states - Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and
Wyoming - there is presently no requirement of
culpability. See Fla. Stat. Ann. @ 782.04, and @
921.141(5)(d)(West Supp. 1992); Ga. Code Ann. @
26-1101 and @ 27-2534.1 (Michie 1988); S.C. Code
Ann. @ 16-3-20(c)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991);
and Wyo. Stat. @ 6-2-101(a) and @
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6-2-102(h)(iv)(Supp. 1991). Tennessee, as noted
above, was previously a member of this minority
position.
In addition to the legislative response, as Gregg v.
Georgia points out, the jury is a significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values
because it is so directly involved and because it
maintains a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system. 428 U.S. at 181, 96 S.
Ct. at 2929, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 879. Since the
reimposition of the death penalty for felony murder
in 1977, juries have consistently imposed the death
penalty for that offense. See, e.g., State v. Boyd,
797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1990); State v. Irick, 762
S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1988); State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d
858 (Tenn. 1988); State v. Sparks, 727 S.W.2d 480
(Tenn. 1987); State v. Goad, 707 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn.
1986); State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn.
1985); State v. Matson, 666 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn.
1984); State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498 (Tenn.
1982); State v. Coleman, 619 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn.
1981).
The second question that must be answered under
the Black test, adopted from Gregg, is whether the
punishment of death is disproportionate in relation to
the crime for which it is imposed. We are concerned
here only with the imposition of capital punishment
for the crime of felony murder in the abstract.
As stated earlier, under the statute prior to the 1989
revision, a person was guilty of first-degree murder
under the felony murder doctrine without regard to
intent to kill so long as the killing occurred during
the perpetration of a felony. Yet, this absence of
intent does not render the death penalty
disproportionate. As Justice O'Connor observed,
writing for the majority in Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. at 157, 107 S.Ct. at 1688, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 144:
Some nonintentional murderers may be among the
most dangerous and inhumane of all - the person who
tortures another, not caring whether the victim lives
or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the
course of the robbery utterly indifferent to the fact
that the desire to rob may have the unintended
consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the
victim's property. This reckless indifference to the
value of human life may be every bit as shocking to
the moral sense as an intent to kill.
(Emphasis added.) See also Schad v. Arizona, 501
U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991).
In the early case of State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d
127 (Tenn. 1981), the defendant argued that felony
murder resulted in imposition of the death penalty
in the absence of premeditation and in cases involving
the least, rather than the most 'blameworthy' of
murderers, because, it is insisted, the statute contains
no guidelines for ascertaining culpability or the
degree of culpability that will prevent
disproportionate application of the death penalty.
Id., 621 S.W.2d at 140. This Court replied, the
short answer to the issue posed by-defendant is that,
conceding such a result may be possible in the trial
court, it is the statutory and inherent obligation of
this Court to correct the error on appeal. An integral
part of the death penalty statute that must be
construed in pari materia is the automatic review of
every death sentence by this Court. T.C.A. @
39-2406. Subsection (c) of that statute enumerates our
duties that include eliminating any arbitrary,
excessive, or disproportionate imposition of the death
penalty. ...
Id.
Accordingly, rather than an absolute rule of per se
disproportionality, this Court has in the past relied on
its statutory duty of review under Tenn. Code Ann.
@ 39-2-205 [now @ 39-13-206] to assure that the
sentence in each case is not disproportionate or
excessive. We agree with that approach and with
Justice Blackmun's rejection of the per se
proportionality approach in his dissent in Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 613-19, 98 S. Ct. 2954,
2969-71, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 995-98. He observed in
that connection that a sentence in felony murder
should be based on evidence of a particular
defendant's participation in homicide and his mens
rea in regard to the homicidal act.
We, therefore, reaffirm the rejection of a per se
proportionality approach in favor of the required
statutory proportionality review.
The third question for the Court under the Black
test is whether the infliction of the death penalty for
felony murder goes beyond that necessary to
accomplish any legitimate penological objective. On
the one hand it has been argued that, because felony
murder encompasses unintentional and accidental
murders, the legitimate penological objective of
deterrence is not satisfied. In response, we observe
that the legislature may decide that the death penalty
is even more effective in deterring felony murders
than simple atrocious murders since an experienced
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felon is more likely to assess the consequences of his
acts than other murderers who are more likely to act
on passion or impulse, unmindful of the consequences
of their actions. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086,
1104 (5th Cir. 1982)(replying to an equal
protection/due process challenge to capital felony
murder). See Crump & Crump, In Defense of the
Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
359 (1985).
"The death penalty is said to serve two principal
social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes by prospective offenders." Gregg v. Georgia,
supra, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. at 2929-30, 49 L.
Ed. 2d at 880. As we commented in Black:
while increasingly questioned, retribution remains a
valid penological justification for the death penalty.
Capital punishment is an expression of society's
moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This
function may be unappealing to many, but it is
essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to
rely on legal processes rather than self-help to
vindicate their wrongs.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. at
2930. Channeling man's natural instinct for
retribution "serves an important purpose in promoting
the stability of a society governed by law" for "the
seeds of anarchy are sown" when "people begin to
believe that organized society is unwilling or unable
to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they 'deserve.' " Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
308, 92 S.Ct. at 2761 (Stewart, J., concurring).
State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 190.
Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be
the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an
expression of the community's belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to
humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 184, 96 S.Ct. at
2930, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 880-81.
We conclude that the death penalty for felony
murder in Tennessee does not per se violate Article
I, @ 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. As we
observed in Black, the issue of whether or not the
death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment is, in the last analysis, a moral question
which has been resolved in this State by our
legislature as the representative of the people. It is
not the role of this Court to "superimpose personal
morality" in difficult issues, State v. Campbell, 103
Wash. 2d 1, 34, 691 P.2d 929, 948 (1984), nor to
act as "a good reflex of a democratic society."
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525, 71 S.
Ct. 857, 875, 95 L. Ed. 1137, 1161 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). For these reasons, we
reaffirm the prior holdings of this Court that the
death penalty in felony murder does not per se violate
Article I, @ 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.
PART III.
SENTENCING PHASE - CONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION OF
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
A corollary to the general argument that imposing
the death penalty for felony murder is not
constitutional is that Tennessee's death penalty statute
does not sufficiently narrow the population of
death-eligible defendants under the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I,
@ 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. The argument
is that it fails to narrow by allowing the use of Tenn
Code Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(7) as an aggravating
circumstance in sentencing.
As applied in this case, prior to the revision of the
Criminal Code of 1989, the aggravating circumstance
of committing a murder during a felony essentially
duplicated the elements of the offense of first-degree
felony murder. Tenn. Code Ann. @ 39-2-202(a)(1)
(Supp. 1988) provided, in part, that "every murder .
. . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any murder in the first degree, arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft
piracy, or the unlawful throwing, placing or
discharging of a destructive device or bomb, is
murder in the first degree." The aggravating
circumstance set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-2-203(i)(7)(1982), allowed a sentence of death
upon a conviction of first-degree murder where the
murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in the
commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was
fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any
first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful
throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb.
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This duplication of the elements of the offense by
one of the aggravating factors has been challenged by
capital defendants in the past. Some of the earlier
attacks were based on double jeopardy and the
argument that conviction under the felony murder
aspect of @ 39-2-202 required an automatic or
mandatory death penalty because the jury had already
found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an
aggravating circumstance at the guilt phase of the
trial. These arguments were rejected by the Court.
State v. Barnes, 703 S.W.2d 611, 618 (Tenn. 1985);
State v. Laney, 654 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. 1983);
State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.
1981); Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267, 276
(Tenn. 1980). Our legislature, however, has seen fit
to prohibit such duplication by statute in non-capital
sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. @ 40-35-111
(1982) and @ 40-35-114 (1990), and we are of the
opinion that Article I, @ 16 of the Tennessee
Constitution prohibits such duplication in capital
sentencing, as well.
Our sister state of North Carolina has accepted the
double-counting challenge to its death penalty statute,
which contained similar duplicative aggravating
circumstances. In State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257
S.E.2d 551 (1979), the North Carolina Supreme
Court pointed out that their felony murder
aggravating circumstance would always be supported
by the evidence in a felony murder conviction, since
the felony murder, by definition, must have occurred
during the commission or attempted commission of
one of the enumerated felonies. Id., 298 N.C. at
112, 257 S.E.2d at 567. The North Carolina court
held:
The problem here presented arises because [the
felony murder aggravating] circumstance is inherent
in, and a necessary element of, the capital felony,
to-wit, felony murder.
A defendant convicted of a felony murder,
nothing else appearing, will have one aggravating
circumstance "pending" for no other reason than the
nature of the conviction. On the other hand, a
defendant convicted of a premeditated and deliberated
killing, nothing else appearing, enters the sentencing
phase with no strikes against him. This is highly
incongruous, particularly in light of the fact that the
felony murder may have been unintentional, whereas,
a premeditated murder is, by definition, intentional
and preconceived.
We are of the opinion that, nothing else appearing,
the possibility that a defendant convicted of a felony
murder will be sentenced to death is
disproportionately higher than the possibility that a
defendant convicted of a premeditated killing will be
sentenced to death due to the "automatic" aggravating
circumstance dealing with the underlying felony. To
obviate this flaw in the statute, we hold that when a
defendant is convicted of first-degree murder under
the felony murder rule, the trial judge shall not
submit to the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial
the aggravating circumstance concerning the
underlying felony.
State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. at 113, 257 S.E.2d at
567-68. See also, State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275
S.E.2d 450 (1981); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28,
274 S.E.2d 183 (1981).
In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct.
2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983), the United States
Supreme Court said that in order to comply with the
Eighth Amendment, aggravating circumstances must
"genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder." Id., 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S. Ct. at 2742,
77 L. Ed. 2d at 249-50. It seems obvious that
Tennessee's statute fails to narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty because:
Automatically instructing the sentencing body on the
underlying felony in a felony-murder case does
nothing to aid the jury in its task of distinguishing
between first-degree homicides and defendants for the
purpose of imposing the death penalty. Relevant
distinctions dim, since all participants in a
felony-murder, regardless of varying degrees of
culpability, enter the sentencing stage with at least
one aggravating factor against them.
A comparison of the sentencing treatments afforded
first-degree-murder defendants further highlights the
impropriety of using the underlying felony to
aggravate felony-murder. The felony murderer, in
contrast to the premeditated murderer, enters the
sentencing stage with one aggravating circumstance
automatically charged against him. This disparity in
sentencing treatment bears no relationship to
legitimate distinguishing features upon which the
death penalty might constitutionally rest.
Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 560 (Wyo.
1984)(Rose, J., dissenting) See also Wiley v.
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Mississippi, 479 U.S. 906, 107 S. Ct. 304, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 278 (1986)(Marshall, J., dissenting); Engberg
v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 199 1)(adopting Justice
Rose's position).
In his thoughtful article analyzing thejurisprudence
of death, Professor Richard Rosen correctly notes
that the movement by the U.S. Supreme Court to
constitutionally narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty began in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346
(1972), a case in which a majority of the Justices
held the existing systems of capital punishment
constitutionally deficient at that time. Richard A.
Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 1103, 1106
(1990). The pre-Furman capital sentencing statutes in
the various states were similar in that the defendant
was made eligible for capital punishment by the
substantive law of homicide. Id., 31 B.C. L. Rev. at
1107. After a guilty finding, then the sentencer,
usually as part of the same proceeding, was given
unfettered discretion to impose the death penalty.
Id., 31 B.C. L. Rev. at 1107-08. The Justices in the
majority in Furman focused on the random, arbitrary,
capricious, and discriminatory application of the
death penalty under these statutes. Id., 31 B.C. L.
Rev. at 1108.
In reviewing the statutes passed by states since
Furman, the Court's focus has been on the process of
selecting those to be killed, with the over-arching
goal of ensuring that those defendants chosen for
execution be in some way worse, or materially more
depraved, than those other first-degree murderers not
executed. Id., 31 B.C. L. Rev. at 1109-10 (citing
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433, 100 S. Ct.
1759, 1767, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 409 (1980)). The
Court has relied primarily on procedural protections
to realize its Eighth Amendment goals. Id., 31 B.C.
L. Rev. at 1110. A state first must narrow the class
of homicide defendants who are eligible for the death
penalty to ensure that even if some materially more
depraved murderers manage to avoid the death
penalty, those chosen will, at least, be among the
worst offenders. Id. This narrowing, however, is
insufficient by itself to satisfy the Eighth
Amendment. Id.
The Court has prohibited a mandatory death
penalty for even the narrowest class of murder
defendants. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 97 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1987).
Instead, after restricting the class of death-eligible
offenses, a state must utilize additional procedures
that assure reliability in the determination that death
is the appropriate punishment in a given capital case.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct.
2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976).
To meet this reliability requirement, a state must
permit the sentencer to make an individualized
determination on the basis of the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant
v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S. Ct. at
2744, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 251 (1983). The defendant
thus is entitled to present and have the sentencer fully
consider all relevant evidence in mitigation of
sentence. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4,
106 S. Ct. 1669, 1670-71, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6 (1986).
The state also is allowed, but not required, to present
a wide range of evidence in aggravation, as long as
it is relevant to the sentencing decision and promotes
the reliability of that determination. See, e.g.,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 3383,
77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1983). In theory, both the
restriction of discretion attendant upon the narrowing
requirement and the increase in discretion caused by
the full and unfettered consideration of mitigation,
serve the underlying goal of weeding out those who
do not convincingly deserve the death penalty.
Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. Rev. at 1111.
As a constitutionally necessary first step under the
Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has required
the states to narrow the sentencers' consideration of
the death penalty to a smaller, more culpable class of
homicide defendants than the pre-Furman class of
death-eligible murderers. See Pulley v. Harris, 465
U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1984). A
state, however, must not only genuinely narrow the
class of death eligible defendants, but must do so in
a way that reasonably justifies the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder. Zant v. Stephens,
supra, 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S. Ct. at 2742, 77 L.
Ed. 2d at 249-50. A proper narrowing device,
therefore, provides a principled way to distinguish the
case in which the death penalty was imposed from the
many cases in which it was not, Godfrey v. Georgia,
supra, 446 U.S. at 433, 100 S. Ct. at 1767, 64 L.
Ed. 2d at 409, and must differentiate a death penalty
case in an objective, even-handed, and substantially
rational way from the many murder cases in which
the death penalty may not be imposed. Zant, supra,
462 U.S. at 879, 103 S. Ct. at 2744, 77 L. Ed. 2d at
251. As a result, a proper narrowing device insures
that, even though some defendants who fall within the
restricted class of death-eligible defendants manage to
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avoid the death penalty, those who receive it will be
among the worst murderers - those whose crimes are
particularly serious, or for which the death penalty is
peculiarly appropriate. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).
The critical role played by this narrowing
requirement is especially significant in light of the
discretion which the Court has mandated for the
sentencing body in a capital case. Because a capital
sentencer now must be allowed wide discretion - a
discretion not unlike that used before Furman - to
impose a life sentence based upon any mitigating
evidence concerning the character of the defendant or
the circumstances of the crime, the sentencer should
be restricted to using this discretion on a class of
murderers that is demonstrably smaller and more
blame worthy than the class of pre-Furman murderers
eligible for the death penalty.
States have adopted different methods to narrow
the class of death-eligible defendants, but in the large
majority of states, the class is narrowed by
aggravating circumstances. Rosen, Felony Murder
and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death,
31 B.C. L. Rev. at 1122. Tennessee has not chosen
to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants by
re-defining its murder statute, but rather has chosen
to do so by listing a number of specific aggravating
factors and expressly requiring the finding of a least
one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt before the death penalty can be imposed. It
joins 24 other states in that requirement. Special
Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the
Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 Cornell L.
Rev. 1129, 1240, n. 732 (1984).
A few states have chosen to narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants by providing restrictive
definitions of first-degree, or capital, murder.
Rosen, Felony Murder, 31 B.C. L. Rev. at 1123. In
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546,
98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1988), the Supreme Court
approved this alternative approach, holding that no
requirement existed for narrowing the class at the
sentencing stage, provided that the class of
death-eligible defendants is, in fact, genuinely
narrowed at the definitional stage. Id., 484 U.S. at
244-46, 108 S. Ct. at 554-55, 98 L. Ed. 2d at
581-83. Recognizing that Tennessee has not chosen
to narrow at the definitional stage, it should be noted
that the legislature has, in fact, broadened its
first-degree murder statute by adding death by child
abuse, which makes the class even larger than
pre-Furman. See Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-2-202(a)(2)(Supp. 1988) and Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-13-202(a)(4)(1991). But see State v. Hale,
S.W.2d (Tenn. 1992), in which this Court held
the statute unconstitutionally deprived the defendant
of due process under Article I, @ 8(a) of the
Tennessee Constitution.
In addition to having different methods for
narrowing the class of death eligible defendants,
states have different definitions of first-degree felony
murder. As noted earlier, some states are pure
felony murder states; that is, they allow the
defendants to be sentenced to death solely because the
killing took place during an accompanying felony.
Tennessee was one of those states before 1989.1 In
these states, a defendant first can be convicted of
first-degree murder because of the felony. Then, the
defendant can be sentenced to death because the
felony is used as an aggravating circumstance,
unqualified at either stage by any mens rea
requirement. Rosen, Felony Murder, 31 B.C. L.
Rev. at 1125-26.
Rosen points out that in those states, which includes
Tennessee, the felony murder narrowing device fails
to meet both the quantitative and qualitative
requirements for a narrowing device. It provides no
meaningful narrowing and, to the extent that
narrowing does exist, it does not serve to identify the
defendants most deserving of death. In these states,
felony murderers are treated essentially the same as
they were pre-Furman . . . the simple fact of the
accompanying felony makes the defendant
death-eligible [and] the jury then can exercise its
unfettered discretion to determine whether defendant
is to live or die.
Id., 31 B.C. L. Rev. at 1127.
Commentators have always criticized the felony
murder rule for its bootstrapping effect. Id. It vaults
an offense into the class of murders without the
malice finding usually required, and then, still
without any culpability finding, elevates what
otherwise might not be a murder to first-degree
murder. Id. In addition, in pure felony murder
states, such as Tennessee before 1989, a third level
of bootstrapping arises as the felony murder
defendant is moved up into the supposedly restricted
class of defendants eligible for death. Id.
The perverse result of the felony murder narrowing
device is even more troubling because the usual class
of first-degree murderers is made up largely of two
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groups of defendants - felony murderers and
premeditated and deliberated murderers. The only
defendants who are eliminated by the felony murder
narrowing device are those who kill with
premeditation and deliberation - i.e., in cold blood
- but not during the course of a felony. A simple
felony murder unaccompanied by any other
aggravating factor is not worse than a simple,
premeditated, and deliberate murder. If anything, the
latter, which by definition involves a killing in cold
blood, involves more culpability.
A few states qualify their felony murder narrowing
devices by requiring that the defendant possess a
specified mens rea of recklessness or culpable
negligence at either the guilt or sentencing stage.
Tennessee has done so since 1989. See 1989 Tenn.
Pub. Acts, ch. 591, @ 1. All felony murderers,
however, potentially meet a recklessness standard;
that is, one who purposely undertakes a felony that
results in a death, almost always can be found
reckless. Therefore, the narrowing devices in these
states are essentially no different from those in the
pure felony murder states.
Furthermore , the Supreme Court case of Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed.
2d 127 (1987), now places a nationwide threshold of
culpability at the reckless indifference level, meaning
that a defendant who acts without reckless
indifference is not constitutionally eligible for the
death penalty. Id., 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S. Ct.
at 1687-88, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 144-45. Therefore, since
the absence of reckless indifference constitutionally
immunizes a defendant from the death penalty, its
presence cannot meaningfully further narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants.
In Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.
1985), the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals relied on
Zant, supra, and the principles of Godfrey, supra, to
hold that duplication by an aggravating circumstance
of the underlying capital felony violated the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.! The Court
commented:
The question, rather, is whether use of an
aggravating circumstance that duplicates an element
of crime itself is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, as applied to the states by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Two
recent Supreme court opinions, Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398
(1980)(plurality opinion), and Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983),
clearly indicate that such a violation has occurred
here. Aggravating circumstances, in order to comply
with the Eighth Amendment, must "genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
. . . reasonably justify the imposition of a more
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others
found guilty of murder." Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2742-43
(footnote omitted). An aggravating circumstance is
an objective criterion that can be used to distinguish
a particular defendant on whom the jury has decided
to impose the death sentence from other defendants
who have committed the same underlying capital
crime. Aggravating circumstances serve to reduce
the danger that the death penalty will be wantonly or
arbitrarily imposed, a danger that was uppermost in
the Court's mind when Furman v. Georgia . . . was
decided. . . .
We see no escape from the conclusion that an
aggravating circumstance which merely repeats an
element of the underlying crime cannot perform this
narrowing function.
Id., 754 F.2d at 263-64.
This Court has previously refused to follow the
Collins rationale by finding it inapplicable under the
Tennessee Constitution. See State v. Smith, 755
S.W.2d 757, 768 (Tenn. 1988); State v. King, 694
S.W.2d 941, 946 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Laney, 654
S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. 1983); and State v.
Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn. 1981). In
State v. Smith, supra, the Court's reason for rejecting
the Collins rationale was as follows:
This precise question, however, was before the
Supreme Court of the United States in Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d
568 (1988), cert. granted 483 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct.
3227, 97 L.Ed.2d 734 (1987). There the Court
upheld the position that we have taken herein and in
Pritchett and King, supra, that use of the underlying
felony, in this case armed robbery, as an aggravating
circumstance upon which the jury may base a death
penalty is constitutionally permissible.
Id., 755 S.W.2d at 768.
The difficulty with that conclusion is that in
Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Louisiana death penalty
statute sufficiently narrowed the class of death
eligible murderers by narrowly defining capital
murder so that the class of death eligible defendants
did not have to be further narrowed by aggravating
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circumstances. 484 U.S. at 244-46, 108 S. Ct. at
554-55, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 581-83. Since the statute
sufficiently narrowed the class of death eligible by
narrowly defining capital murder, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute, despite
the fact that the sole aggravating circumstance found
was identical to an element of the capital crime of
which the petitioner had been convicted. Id.
In upholding the Louisiana statute, the Court
concluded that the narrowing function required may
be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing
phase of the trial or the guilt phase, and that the
legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital
offenses, as Louisiana has done, or the legislature
may more broadly define capital offenses and provide
for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating
circumstances at the penalty phase. Id., 484 U.S. at
244-45, 108 S. Ct. at 554, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 581-82.
It is clear that Tennessee has a broad definition of
murder and has not narrowed in the definitional
stage. Accordingly, Lowenfield is inapposite and
provides no rationale for constitutionality under the
Tennessee Constitution.
We have determined that in light of the broad
definition of felony murder and the duplicating
language of the felony murder aggravating
circumstance, no narrowing occurs under Tennessee's
first-degree murder statute. We hold that, when the
defendant is convicted of first-degree murder solely
on the basis of felony murder, the aggravating
circumstance set out in Tenn. Code Ann. @@
39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) and 39-13-204(i)(7)(1991), does
not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers
sufficiently under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and Article I, @ 16 of the Tennessee
Constitution because it duplicates the elements of the
offense. As a result, we conclude that Tenn. Code
Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(7) is unconstitutionally applied
under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Article I, @ 16 of the Tennessee Constitution
where the death penalty is imposed for felony
murder. Accordingly, we expressly overrule State v.
Smith, 755 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn. 1988), and its
progeny on this issue.
As stated at the beginning of this Opinion, under
our holding today, felony murder continues to be a
death-eligible offense. However, a finding of an
aggravating circumstance other than Tenn. Code
Ann. @ 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) and @ 39-13-204(i)(7)
(1991) is necessary to support death as a penalty for
that crime.
Because, in this case, the jury has found two
aggravating circumstances are supported by the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, it is necessary
for this case to be remanded for re-sentencing. Even
though the evidence amply supports the aggravating
circumstance of the murder being especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or
depravity of mind, Tenn. Code Ann. @
39-2-203(i)(5)(1982), we are unable to conclude that
the elimination of the aggravating circumstance (i)(7)
is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, we remand this case for re-sentencing
where the State will be free to reseek the death
penalty if it so desires. The costs of this appeal are
taxed to the State of Tennessee.
E. RILEY ANDERSON, Justice
Drowota and O'Brien, JJ., concurring in Parts I and
II and dissenting in Part III. See separate Opinion.
Reid, C.J., and Daughtrey, J., concurring in Parts I
and III and dissenting in Part II. See separate
Opinion.
CONCURBY: FRANK F. DROWOTA,
O'BRIEN, LYLE REID, DAUGHTREY
DISSENTBY: FRANK F. DROWOTA,
O'BRIEN, LYLE REID, DAUGHTREY
III,
III,
DISSENT: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
OPINION
I would affirm the Defendant's conviction of
first-degree felony murder and his sentence of death;
therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part. I
concur with Part I of Justice Anderson's majority
opinion, in which all members of this Court find that
there is no error in the guilt phase. I also concur
with Part II of Justice Anderson's opinion, in which
he finds the death penalty may constitutionally be
imposed upon conviction under the felony-murder
statute, T.C.A. @ 39-2-202(a) (1982). As the
majority opinion reveals, the Defendant did not raise
the issue of the constitutionality of Tennessee's death
penalty statute as punishment for felony murder.
However, we wish to address this question because
the present Court has not yet considered this
important issue. As members of the former Court,
Justice O'Brien and I have previously upheld the
constitutionality of capital punishment for felony
murder. Today, a three-member majority of the
present Court reaffirms the prior holdings of this
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Court on this issue, beginning with State v. Dicks,
615 S.W.2d 126 (1981).
I would like to acknowledge that, although prior
decisions of this Court have held the death penalty in
felony murder to be constitutional, no former opinion
of this Court has articulated in such depth and
scholarly manner the issue now before us, as has
Justice Anderson in Part II of this opinion. The
dissent of Chief Justice Reid, joined by Justice
Daughtrey, to Part II of the majority opinion states:
*The statute still does not effectively limit the class of
death-eligible defendants (which is a group different
from those actually executed) to those most deserving
of death as punishment and, therefore, it violates the
Tennessee constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment." I respond only by saying I
respectfully disagree with the analysis found in the
dissent filed by my colleagues, including the
simplistic categorization of cases based on the
presence of intent to kill.
I dissent from Part Ill of the majority opinion
which holds that use of the aggravating circumstance
in T.C.A. @ 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) [now @
39-13-204(i)(7)(1991)] to impose a sentence of death
in cases of felony murder violates the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, @ 16, of the Tennessee Constitution. This
same position, under the various guises of double
jeopardy, mandatory death penalty and inadequate
narrowing, has previously been rejected by this
Court. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d 757,
768 (Tenn. 1988); State v. Barnes, 703 S.W.2d 611,
618 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d
808, 816 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Smith, 695 S.W.2d
954, 959-960 (Tenn. 1985); State v. King, 694
S.W.2d 941, 946 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Laney, 654
S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Pritchett,
621 S.W.2d 127, 139-141 (Tenn. 1981); Houston v.
State, 593 S.W.2d 267, 276 (Tenn. 1980). In State v.
Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d at 140-141, the Court rejected
the rationale of State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257
S.E.2d 551 (1979), now adopted by the Court; and
in State v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d at 768, we held that
our statute complied with the constitutional
requirement of "narrowing" under Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d
568 (1988).
No intervening law compels that we abandon these
former decisions. I find disturbing the tendency of
members of this Court to disregard long established
precedents in capital punishment decisions.
Consistency in the law is of utmost importance,
particularly in this area of the law. Inconsistency
creates questions and concerns that leave the bench
and bar without any confidence that what was said
yesterday will hold true for tomorrow.
My disagreement with the majority is not based
solely on the principle of stare decisis, however. It
also arises from my conviction that these previous
decisions are not in error and that the statute does not
contravene the requirements of either the Eighth
Amendment or Article I, @ 16. As was pointed out
in Pritchett, the United States Supreme Court has
implicitly approved an identical application of the
felony element of the offense of felony murder as a
valid aggravating circumstance for imposition of the
death penalty in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96
S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). There the Court
held that the Florida capital sentencing system, upon
which our statute was in part closely modeled, on its
face satisfied the constitutional deficiencies identified
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)
(upholding death penalty under Georgia statute
effectively allowing similar duplication under the
facts of the case). The United States Supreme Court
has also explicitly held that there is no Eighth
Amendment prohibition against using an element
necessary to the conviction of first-degree murder as
an aggravating circumstance to support the death
penalty. Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra; see also State
v. Cauthern, 778 S.W.2d 39, 47 (Tenn. 1989).
The majority, however, finds that the statute fails
to "narrow" the class of death eligible defendants
sufficiently to satisfy the cruel and unusual clauses of
the two constitutions because, in the case of felony
murder, the statute returns our sentencing scheme to
the days before Furman, when the jury was given
unfettered discretion to determine who lived and who
died. This is neither a correct assessment of the
statute nor of Furman and its progeny. The concern
in Furman was that the death penalty not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial
risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
188, 96 S.Ct. at 2932. Its guiding principle was that
the sentencer's discretion must be suitably directed
and limited and must be exercised in an informed
manner. Id. at 189, 96 S.Ct. at 2932. The sentencer
must have relevant information under fair procedural
rules and be provided with standards to guide its use
of this information. Id. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935. As
stated in Proffitt v. Florida, "the requirements of
Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's
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discretion is guided and channeled by requiring
examination of specific factors that argue in favor of
or against imposition of the death penalty, thus
eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its
imposition." 428 U.S. at 258, 96 S.Ct. at 2969.
Furman nowhere mentions the concept of
"narrowing" as understood by the majority.
Aggravating factors are considered "means of
confining the sentencers' discretion - giving them
something specific to look for rather than leaving
them to wander at large among all aggravating
circumstances." Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3063, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring). So long as the aggravating
circumstance is not unconstitutionally vague, i.e., so
vague as to fail adequately to channel the sentencing
patterns of juries, it may serve as the basis for
imposing capital punishment. See Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77
L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).
But aggravating factors are not the only component
of a capital sentencing system assuring that the
commands of Furman are met. The system must be
examined as a whole just as it works as a whole. In
addition to aggravating factors, our statute further
guides and channels the sentencer's discretion by
providing a bifurcated proceeding, requiring
consideration of mitigating circumstances, explicitly
directing the manner in which the jury must weigh
the various sentencing factors, and mandating
meaningful appellate review. See Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. at 875, 103 S.Ct. at 2741; Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. at 252-253, 96 S.Ct. at 2967;
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 191, 96 S.Ct. at
2933. The cumulative effect of these procedural
safeguards assures that our statute's use of the
underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance
does not violate the principles of Furman.
As its reliance on the quoted language from State
v. Cherry discloses, the majority decision is based to
a large extent upon the potential problems of
disproportionality inherent in allowing capital
punishment for felony murder. Allowing the
underlying felony to act as an aggravating
circumstance does not, however, result in imposition
of the death penalty in a disproportionate manner.
First of all, it is well-settled that under the Eighth
Amendment death is not a disproportionate
punishment for felony murder so long as the
defendant in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended
that a killing take place or that lethal force be used,
or the defendant was a major participant in the felony
and exhibited reckless indifference to human life.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158, 107 S.Ct.
1676, 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368,
3376-3377, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). Yet the
majority's decision removes wholesale this category
of persons," unquestionably death eligible under the
Eighth Amendment, from the list of those upon
whom the state can impose capital punishment unless
some factor beyond the commission of the felony is
present in the crime. I cannot, however, consider
"unreasonable, unjust or unconstitutional" the
legislature's determination that killings perpetrated
during a felony occur under circumstances of
enhanced culpability sufficient to expose the
perpetrator and certain accomplices to a death
sentence. See Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 567
(Del. 1985). I believe that, applied under the
constitutional restrictions set forth in Tison and
Enmund, T.C.A. @ 39-2-203(i)(7) constitutionally
narrows the category of death eligible defendants in
the case of felony murder at the sentencing stage. To
the extent that the majority's decision rests upon
concerns that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for some types of conduct falling under
the felony murder statute, our sentencing system,
created to meet the mandates of Furman, may be
trusted to discern and remove those persons
perpetrating these less egregious forms of felony
murder from the list of those condemned to death.
It is here that this Court's obligations under
T.C.A. @ 39-13-206 [formerly @ 39-2-205] become
critical. In order to prevent the execution of all but
the most deserving of murderers and to avoid
arbitrary and capricious sentencing, the Court reviews
all felony-murder cases to assure that a sentence of
death has not been arbitrarily imposed, that the
evidence supports the jury's findings and that the
sentence of death is not disproportionate. For
purposes of the death penalty, a distinction must be
drawn in felony-murders between cold-blooded,
execution-style murders and accidental, unforeseen
killings or accomplice killings. However, the
mechanical narrowing adopted by the Court today
bears no relationship to these considerations. 0
Following a jurisprudence of case specific
proportionality review, on the other hand, ensures
that the dictates of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and their state counterparts, Article 1,
@@ 16 and 8, are met in capital felony murders.
Applying these principles to the present case, I
would find: that the sentence of death was not
imposed in an arbitrary fashion; that the evidence
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supports the jury's findings of two statutory
aggravating circumstances; and that the evidence
supports the jury's finding of the absence of
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances so found.
The sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the nature of the crime and the Defendant. See
State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1989); State
v. Miller, 771 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. 1989); State v.
West, 767 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1989); State v.
Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1985); State v.
Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1983); State v.
Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. 1981). The
defendant's culpability also meets the criteria of
Tison and Enmund, supra. The aggravating
circumstances applied are constitutionally valid. This
torture-murder of a kidnapped child unquestionably is
one of the most aggravated killings that this Court
has seen. The fourteen-year-old victim's ordeal, as
described in the majority opinion, began at 7:30 p.m.
and ended at 11 p.m. This brutal and tragic murder
is certainly one of the "worst of the bad."
I would affirm the judgment both as to the
defendant's guilt and his sentence of death. I am
authorized to state that Justice O'Brien concurs in this
opinion. .
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III
Concurs:
JUSTICE
O'Brien, J. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
OPINION
I concur in Part I of the majority Opinion
affirming the conviction of first degree murder.
My position with regard to Part II is that even if
the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by Article I, Section 16 of the
Tennessee Constitution, the imposition of death upon
a conviction of felony murder is not a single
constitutional issue that can be resolved "in the
abstract"; Article I, Section 16 imposes a standard of
proof higher than the federal standard of reckless
indifference; and, therefore, T.C.A. @ 39-2-203
(1982), as construed in the majority Opinion violates
Article I, Section 16.
I concur in Part III of the majority Opinion's
holding that the use of felony murder as an
aggravating circumstance when the offense of which
the defendant is convicted is felony murder does not
accomplish the constitutional objective of narrowing
the class of death-eligible murderers, and therefore
T.C.A. @ 39-13-204(i)(7) is constitutionally invalid.
This holding based on Article I, Section 16 of the
Tennessee Constitution is a step toward limiting the
jury's discretion in imposing capital punishment to a
"demonstrably smaller and more blameworthy" class
of murderers. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988).
However, even with the felony murder aggravating
circumstance eliminated, the Tennessee sentencing
statute still includes in the class of death-eligible
defendants accidental and unintentional murderers
whose culpability is minimal. It still allows
convictions for first degree felony murder of persons
who killed accidentally or unintentionally and those
who did not kill, did not intend to kill and did not
intend that any person suffer any physical harm. The
statute still does not effectively limit the class of
death-eligible defendants (which is a group different
from those actually executed) to those most deserving
of death as punishment and, therefore, it violates the
Tennessee constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Consequently, the statute falls
short of the constitutional mandate that the death
penalty be imposed upon only those murderers who
are the "worst of the bad."
The evil identified by the United States Supreme
Court cases construing and implementing the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is not the death penalty itself but, as
discussed in the majority Opinion, the random,
arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application
of the death penalty. So long as a state under its law
elects to impose the death penalty, the United States
Constitution mandates fairness and proportionality in
the imposition. The procedure followed by a state
must, as stated in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 554, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (quoting
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77
L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983)), "genuinely narrow the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe
sentence on the defendant compared to others found
guilty of murder." The constitutional objective is that
the sentence imposed "reflect a reasoned moral
response to the defendant's background, character,
and crime." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.
Ct. 2934, 2947, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (quoting
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S. Ct.
837, 841, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987)) (concurring
opinion) (emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized
385
that this "reasoned moral response" is determined by
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 99, 78 S. Ct. 590, 597, 2 L.Ed.2d 630
(1958). See State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 188
(Tenn. 1991). The standards of decency are
reflections of the essential character of the people of
the state, their virtues, their faults. To be
constitutional, the process must insure the effective
application of society's present standards of decency.
Implicit in death penalty jurisprudence is the
recognition that the standards of decency are not
static but evolving, that society is not stale but
maturing, and that the level of community morality
will continue to rise until the reasoned moral
response of the people of Tennessee will be, if it is
not already, that the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment. Until that standard is
recognized, the focus must be on fairness and
proportionality among those that the process allows to
be executed.
The process whereby the death penalty may be
imposed in Tennessee consists of three stages - the
determination that the defendant is not in a category
of murderers upon whom the death penalty may not
be imposed regardless of the other circumstances of
the case; the minimum proof regarding the defendant
and the crime that will support a jury's imposition of
the death penalty; and the comparative proportionality
review on appeal mandated by statute.
Certain categories of defendants are not subject to
the death penalty regardless of the circumstances of
the murder. T.C.A. @ 39-13-204 limits the
imposition of the death penalty to the offense of first
degree murder. T.C.A. @ 39-13-203 prohibits the
imposition of a sentence of death upon any mentally
retarded defendant. T.C.A. @ 37-1-134-(a)(1)(A)
protects juveniles from the sentence of death. This
decision adds to those categories in which the
defendant is not death-eligible: those charged only
with felony murder with felony murder as the only
aggravating circumstance.
The second stage is the jury trial. Juries may
impose the death penalty only upon those defendants
who are members of the class of death eligibles. In
cases in which the defendant is not in a category
exempt from the sentence of death, the minimum
standards for determining whether a sentence of death
may be constitutionally imposed for felony murder
under the federal constitution are those set by the
United States Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140
(1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.
Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). Those cases dealt
with the problem ofimposing the death penalty in
cases of vicarious liability for felony murder, i.e.,
where an accomplice in the felony, one who did not
actually kill the victim, is convicted of murder under
the felony murder doctrine and receives the death
penalty. Under the rules of those cases the death
penalty is only permissible under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments for one who himself kills,
attempts to kill, or intends that a killing take place or
that lethal force will be imposed (Enmund), or for
one whose personal involvement in the underlying
felony is substantial and who exhibits a reckless
disregard or indifference to the value of human life
(Tison).
As discussed in the majority Opinion, Tennessee
does not narrow the death-eligible class by the
statutory definition of first-degree felony murder.
Under the Tennessee felony statute, proof of malice,
deliberation, and premeditation, or that the defendant
intended to kill the victim, is not necessary to support
a death sentence. State v. Johnson, 661 S.W.2d 854,
861 (Tenn. 1984); Farmer v. State, 201 Tenn. 107,
296 S.W.2d 879 (1956); State v. Hopper, 695
S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); Tosh v.
State, 527 S.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1975). Consequently, there are included in the class
of death-eligible felony murderers those who killed
accidentally or unintentionally and those who did not
kill, did not intend to kill, and did not intend that any
person suffer physical harm. Since the felony
murder statute by definition does not narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants, narrowing must be
accomplished, if at all, at the sentencing phase of the
trial when the jury, pursuant to T.C.A. @
39-13-204(i)(j), considers the relevant aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.
The majority Opinion presents a compelling case
for its conclusion that to be constitutional a
sentencing process must insure that only those
defendants "most deserving" will be executed. It
states that in selecting those defendants to be executed
the over-reaching goal is to insure that those chosen
be in some way worse or materially more depraved
than those other first degree murderers not executed.
See majority Opinion at . The Opinion recognizes
that in order to pass constitutional muster the
procedure "first must narrow" the class of
death-eligible defendants to insure that those executed
"will be among the worst offenders," and, further,
acknowledges that the reckless indifference standard
accomplishes no meaningful limitation on the class of
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defendants eligible for the death penalty. However,
rather than stating the quantum of proof required by
the constitution to genuinely narrow the class of death
eligibles and thus support a jury verdict imposing the
death sentence, it invalidates as unconstitutional only
that section of the statute that allows felony murder
as an aggravating circumstance for the conviction of
felony murder. The rationale is that "T.C.A. @@
39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) and 39-13-204(i)(7) (1991) do
not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers
sufficiently under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the
Tennessee Constitution because they duplicate the
elements of the offense." Id. at . It should be
noted that the constitutional deficiency is that the
aggravating circumstance does not narrow the class,
not that it duplicates the elements of the offense.
Justice Drowota's dissent misses this essential point,
stating, "There is no constitutional prohibition against
using an element of the offense as an aggravating
circumstance." Drowota, J., dissenting at . The
result then is illogical: an aggravating circumstance
that fails to narrow the class because it duplicates the
elements of the offense is unconstitutional, but
aggravating circumstances that fail to narrow the
class for other reasons are not unconstitutional. The
logical conclusion from the majority Opinion's
analysis would be that any provision of the statute
that fails to accomplish the constitutional imperative
to narrow the class is invalid.
The Opinion acknowledges that the felony murder
doctrine has been severely criticized as being harsh
and unjust and that in most jurisdictions in which
felony murder has not been abolished, the death
penalty can be imposed only where killings
perpetuated during felonies are intentional, deliberate,
purposeful, or knowing. Id. at . The Opinion,
however, finds that death as a penalty for felony
murder conforms with contemporary standards of
decency in Tennessee and, therefore, that "in the
abstract" the sentence of death for felony murder is
not per se cruel and unusual punishment. The
standards of decency supporting this conclusion, the
Opinion says, are evidenced by the act of the
legislature enacting the statute and the acts of juries
imposing that penalty in felony murder cases. At the
appropriate time, this subject should be fully
discussed. Perhaps sufficient for the present are the
observations that the legislature is essentially a
political body and that citizens who refuse to consider
the sentence of death as punishment are disqualified
as jurors. In addition, the legislature enacted that
portion of the statute, T.C.A. @ 39-13-20-4(i)(7),
found by the majority Opinion to be unconstitutional
and the jury imposed the sentence of death on the
defendant in this case based upon that statute. This
evidence hardly supports the conclusion that imposing
the death penalty upon a felony murder conviction
does not per se violate Article I, Section 16. More
importantly, that conclusion does not preclude
consideration of those cases in which the imposition
of the death penalty does constitute cruel and unusual
punishment and it does not relieve the Court of the
responsibility for determining the proof necessary to
support a jury's sentence of death. Without this
standard, prosecutors can continue to seek the death
penalty and juries can continue to impose the death
penalty upon no greater proof than that of reckless
indifference.
In determining that standard, the Court need look
no further than its reported decisions. Without
independently examining the requirements of the state
constitution, this Court has, by its decisions,
recognized a higher standard of culpability than that
of reckless indifference set by the United States
Supreme Court. Analysis of our cases indicates that
this Court, while not specifically adopting a
bright-line rule, has found that a felony murderer is
death eligible only where the killing is deliberate or
intentional or accompanied by a conscious purpose of
producing death or a conscious realization that death
will likely occur. Since 1979, this Court has
reviewed and released opinions in approximately 84
cases in which the jury imposed a sentence of death.
Review of these opinions shows that the sentence was
clearly based only on a conviction of felony murder
in 28 cases." The proof in 16 of those 28 cases
shows an intent to kill." In six of the cases proof of
the method of killing or other evidence would support
a finding of intent to kill," even though the issue
was disputed. Two cases involved struggles in which
the intent to kill was not clearly shown, 4 in one
case the defendant confessed to the killing," and
one case is on remand.16 In only two of the 28
felony murder convictions is the intent to kill
seriously in doubt."
The conclusion to be gathered from a review of
these cases is that the jury verdicts imposing the
death penalty upon convictions of felony murder were
supported by proof that the killings were the
proximate result of acts accompanied by an intent to
kill, a conscious purpose to produce death, or a
conscious realization that death likely would occur.
This standard requires an intent with respect to the
killing, not just the underlying felony, and reflects a
moral culpability greater than reckless indifference.
I would hold that Article I, Section 16 requires proof
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of at least this standard.
At the third stage of the process, sentences of
death, based upon sufficient proof as discussed
above, are then subject to a case-specific
proportionality analysis in which this Court reviews
evidence of the defendant's participation in the
homicide and his mens rea in regard to the homicidal
act. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954,
2969-71, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978), (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The review focuses on the defendant's
character and the circumstances of the crime and thus
accomplishes the statutory mandate that this Court
determine whether the sentence of death imposed in
each case "is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
nature of the crime and the defendant." T.C.A. @
39-13-206(c)(1)(D). In accomplishing the
comparative proportionality review, the Court makes
three inquiries: (1) whether the punishment for the
crime conforms with contemporary standards of
decency, (2) whether the punishment is grossly
disproportionate to the offense, and (3) whether the
imposition of the death penalty accomplishes any
legitimate penological objective. State v. Black, 815
S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991).
The majority Opinion, despite having found that
the constitution requires genuine narrowing of the
class of death-eligible defendants and, further, that
narrowing may not occur at the sentencing stage,
nevertheless states, "We, therefore, reaffirm the
rejection of a per se proportionality approach in favor
of the required statutory proportionality review."
Main Opinion at . The effect of this decision is
that prosecutors may indict and juries may convict on
proof of reckless indifference, leaving the
constitutional requirement for narrowing to appellate
review. Both the majority Opinion and Justice
Drowota's dissent agree that the only constitutional
safeguard is review by this Court. Main Opinion at
; Drowota, J., dissenting at . It is at the
appellate review stage that the process in Tennessee
is the most deficient.
The Court is required to perform two distinct
functions, in addition to the consideration of the
assignments of error. It must determine, upon
consideration of the evidence regarding aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, whether the proof
supports the sentence of death; and it must determine,
upon consideration of the nature of the crime and the
defendant, whether the sentence is excessive or
disproportionate in comparison with the penalty
imposed in similar cases. T.C.A. @
39-13-206(c)(1)(A)(B)(C)(D). Essential to the
performance of the first function is the determination
of the quantum of proof required by the constitution
or the statute to impose the death penalty. As
previously discussed, the majority Opinion concludes,
erroneously in my view, that proof of reckless
indifference is sufficient.
Performance of the second function, comparative
proportionality review, requires a determination
different from that of ascertaining the parameters of
the death-eligible class. It requires a consideration
not only of the case before the Court but the
spectrum of sentences in similar cases throughout the
state. See State v. Harris, S.W.2d (Tenn.
1992), Reid, C.J., dissenting. Unfortunately, the
reported decisions do not reflect strict performance of
this function because they do not include a disciplined
proportionality review. What passes for a
comparative proportionality review is essentially a
reiteration of the facts surrounding the commission of
the offense, followed by a conclusory statement that
the death penalty is not disproportionate in that
particular case. Only rarely has the Court even
reviewed the facts of other cases in which the death
penalty has been affirmed. See e.g., State v. Barber,
753 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1988).
The only way to judge the effectiveness of the
death penalty process is to examine the results. If it
"includes defendants who are not necessarily more
deserving of the death penalty and excludes those
who are not necessarily less deserving," the process
fails to genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eight
Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C.L.
Review 1103, 1125 (1990). This determination can
be made only by comparing murderers sentenced to
death with those given less severe sentences, a
procedure not followed in past reported decisions.
The Court obviously has substituted for the
proportionality review required at this third stage of
the proceedings a finding that the proof shows the
defendant to be a member of the death-eligible group
which, under the federal constitution and the
Tennessee statute, includes all cases in which the
proof meets the threshold standard of reckless
indifference. This practice is acknowledged by the
statement in Justice Drowota's dissent that the death
penalty is not disproportionate punishment so long as
the reckless indifference standard of Enmund and
Tison is met. Drowota, J., dissenting at
Consequently, the Court has not found the
punishment disproportionate in any of the 84 cases in
which the sentence of death has been imposed since
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1977. This fact alone would suggest there has been
no effective proportionality review on appeal. It also
places in doubt Justice Drowota's confident assertion
that, "Our sentencing system, created to meet the
mandates of Furman may be trusted to discern and
remove those persons perpetrating these less
egregious forms of felony murder from the list of
those condemned to death." Drowota, J., dissenting
at .
The result is that the class of death-eligible
defendants is not genuinely narrowed by the statutory
definition of felony murder; the sentencing statute by
its terms fails to narrow the class; Article I, Section
16, as interpreted by the majority in this decision,
does not invalidate those provisions of the statute
which do not effect narrowing; and the appellate
review mandated by statute has been limited to a
finding that the proof meets the threshold standard of
reckless indifference.
I concur that the judgment of conviction be
affirmed and that the case be remanded for
sentencing.
I am authorized to state that Justice Daughtrey
concurs in this Opinion.
Lyle Reid, C.J.
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